This dissertation consists of two essays that study how credit expansion and government policy on mortgages shaped the 1999-2010 U.S. housing cycle and business cycle. Chapter 1 studies whether credit expansion or speculation mainly causes the housing cycle. During the 1999-2009 U.S. housing cycle, two opposing empirical facts present a puzzle: the correlation between income growth and mortgage growth is negative across ZIP codes within metropolitan areas (some argue for the credit expansion view) but positive across metropolitan areas (others argue for the speculation view). First, this paper shows that the cross-metropolitan phenomenon, in fact, supports the credit expansion view: by an instrumental variable approach, this paper shows that net export growth across metropolitan areas causes income growth and credit expansion in mortgage growth, which eventually leads to the housing cycle. Second, this chapter builds a simple model to illustrate how credit expansion can reconcile the above two empirical facts. This model generates new predictions of double differences: the differential stronger boom and bust cycle in mortgages and house prices in low-income ZIP codes than in high-income ZIP codes within the same metropolitan area is more pronounced in high net-export-growth metropolitan areas. This paper provides empirical causal evidence for these predictions, further supporting the credit expansion view. Chapter 2 uses the causal framework in Chapter 1 to test which business cycle theory can explain the 1999-2010 U.S. business cycle. This chapter shows that credit expansion in private-label mortgages causes a differentially stronger boom (2000-2006) and bust (2007-2010) cycle in the house-related industries in the high net-export-growth areas. Thus, these results are consistent with the credit-driven household demand hypothesis. Most importantly, the unique research design enables a set of tests on theories (hypotheses) regarding the business cycle. This paper shows that the following theories (hypotheses) cannot explain the cause of the 1999-2010 U.S. business cycle: the speculative euphoria hypothesis, the real business cycle theory, the collateral-driven credit cycle theory, the business uncertainty theory, and the extrapolative expectation theory.

This paper investigates the influence of regulatory sentiment on investment-based crowdfunding across various global markets. Crowdfunding, a capital-raising method where individuals collectively invest in projects, businesses, or causes, has significantly evolved with the advent of digital platforms. The emergence of lending-based and investment-based crowdfunding has led to the development of diverse regulatory frameworks worldwide. This study focuses on the relationship between regulatory sentiment and two critical dimensions of crowdfunding markets: investment volume and platform count. By conducting a multivariate analysis using data from the Cambridge Center for Alternative Finance and GDP statistics from the OECD, the paper examines whether investor sentiment about regulation impacts these two variables across seven developed markets. The research centers around three primary questions: the existence and nature of any statistically significant relationships between regulatory sentiment and investment volume/platform count; and which type of sentiment (adequate, excessive, or inadequate) has the strongest relationship with these variables. The analysis includes a detailed review of regulatory frameworks in the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, and Malaysia. The findings reveal a statistically significant relationship between adequate and excessive regulatory sentiment and both investment volume and platform count, with adequate sentiment showing a positive impact and excessive sentiment demonstrating a negative effect. The results highlight the importance of balanced regulatory frameworks in fostering healthy crowdfunding ecosystems and provide insights into how investor perceptions of regulation can influence market dynamics. Future research could further explore these relationships, potentially using more objective measures of regulations and examining the bidirectional influence between market performance and regulatory sentiment.

This paper studies the relation between alignment in partisan affiliation between a firm's management team and the president and corporate investment. Survey evidence suggest that households have higher expectations of economic growth when their preferred party controls the presidency. I therefore investigate whether finance professionals, specifically corporate managers, are subject to the same partisan-based optimism and make investment decisions not based on fundamentals. Consistent with the behavior displayed by the general public, I find that managers invest more and become more optimistic about their companies' prospects when their preferred party is in power. Using insider trades, I am able to separate optimism from alternative explanations such as industry sorting of partisan managers, political connections, etc. This optimism-driven increase in investment is associated with lower profitability and stock returns. Overall, managers' partisan beliefs produce heterogeneous expectations about future cash flows and distort investment decisions.

The purpose of this paper is to study the impact that poison pills have on the value of share prices after the cancellation of a transaction. While various studies have focused on the generic share price impact of poison pills, very few have focused on the impact of poison pills in cancelled transactions. Based on our research and analysis, in cancelled transactions, target firms that have poison pills prior to the transaction and target firms without poison pills generate returns above the announcement date premium and subsequent investment in the S&P 500 when held to the cancellation of the transaction and when held from cancellation to 6 months after the transaction. This analysis can contribute to the argument that holding shares of firms regardless of cancellation risk is preferable to taking profit at announcement date. Additionally, it can contribute to the study of undiscovered pricing impact of poison pills.

Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) whose observed personal option-holding patterns are not consistent with theoretical predictions are variously described as overconfident or optimistic. Existing literature demonstrates that the investment and financing decisions of such CEOs differ from those of CEOs who do not exhibit such behavior and interprets the investment and financing decisions by overconfident or optimistic CEOs as inferior. This paper argues that it may be rational to exhibit behavior interpreted as optimistic and that the determinants of a CEO’s perceived optimism are important. Further, this paper shows that CEOs whose apparent optimism results from above average industry-adjusted CEO performance in prior years make investment and financing decisions which are actually similar, and sometimes superior to, those of unbiased CEOs.

This paper investigates the role of top management and board interlocks between acquirers and targets. I hypothesize that an interlock may exacerbate agency problems due to conflicting interests and lead to value-decreasing acquisition. An interlock may also serve as a conduit of information and personal experience, and reduce the cost of information gathering for both firms. I find supporting evidence for these two non-mutually exclusive hypotheses. Consistent with the agency hypothesis, interlocked acquirers underperform non-interlocked acquirers by 2% during the announcement period. However, well-governed acquirers receive higher announcement returns and have better post-acquisition performance in interlocked deals. The proportional surplus accrued to an acquirer is positively correlated with the interlocking agent's ownership in the acquirer relative to her ownership in the target. Consistent with the information hypothesis, when the target's firm value is opaque, interlocks improve acquirer announcement returns and long-term performance. Interlocked acquirers are also more likely to use equity as payment, especially when the acquirer's stock value is opaque. Target announcement returns are not influenced by the existence of interlock. Finally, I find acquisitions are more likely to occur between two interlocked firms and such deals have a higher completion rate.

This paper examines how equity analysts' roles as information intermediaries and monitors affect corporate liquidity policy and its associated value of cash, providing new evidence that analysts have a direct impact on corporate liquidity policy. Greater analyst coverage (1) reduces information asymmetry between a firm and outside shareholders and (2) enhances the monitoring process. Consistent with these arguments, analyst coverage increases the value of cash, thereby allowing firms to hold more cash. The cash-to-assets ratio increases by 5.2 percentage points when moving from the bottom analyst-coverage decile to the top decile. The marginal value of $1 of corporate cash holdings is $0.93 for the bottom analyst-coverage decile and $1.83 for the top decile. The positive effects remain robust after a battery of endogeneity checks. I also perform tests employing a unique dataset that consists of public and private firms, as well as a dataset that consists of public firms that have gone private. A public firm with analyst coverage can hold approximately 8% more cash than its private counterpart. These findings constitute new evidence on the real effect of analyst coverage.