This paper studies the relation between alignment in partisan affiliation between a firm's management team and the president and corporate investment. Survey evidence suggest that households have higher expectations of economic growth when their preferred party controls the presidency. I therefore investigate whether finance professionals, specifically corporate managers, are subject to the same partisan-based optimism and make investment decisions not based on fundamentals. Consistent with the behavior displayed by the general public, I find that managers invest more and become more optimistic about their companies' prospects when their preferred party is in power. Using insider trades, I am able to separate optimism from alternative explanations such as industry sorting of partisan managers, political connections, etc. This optimism-driven increase in investment is associated with lower profitability and stock returns. Overall, managers' partisan beliefs produce heterogeneous expectations about future cash flows and distort investment decisions.

Our project examines The Blackstone Group’s $6.1 billion leveraged buyout of TeamHealth in 2016 in detail, as well as the broader implications of the transaction on the healthcare industry. The transaction was preceded by Blackstone’s initial acquisition of the company in 2005, followed by the company’s subsequent IPO in 2009. Our project first covers the history of the target company and profiles key subsidiaries, with an emphasis on the 2015 $1.6B acquisition of IPC by TeamHealth. We then detail the sources and uses of the transaction and explore Blackstone’s stated transaction rationale. We construct a base case financial model that explores Blackstone’s potential projected internal rate of return based on organic growth and potential synergies with IPC alone and without any further tuck-in acquisitions, as well as an acquisition case model that incorporates several future tuck-in acquisitions. Both cases include a detailed buildout of revenue projections, key income statement and balance sheet drivers (including an analysis of changes in healthcare economics and their impact on our revenue build), and forward-looking assumptions on various items including capital expenditures for the target company. Discounted cash flow analysis and leveraged buyout analysis outputs are detailed and discussed for both the base case and acquisition case. We examine the risks and mitigants associated with the transaction and how they may exacerbate issues in a downside case, namely leverage and public markets-related risks that may affect Blackstone’s strategy. Lastly, we investigate the impact the transaction may have on the broader industry from the patient, payor, and physician perspective.

The purpose of this paper is to review the effects of the Dodd-Frank Title VII Clearing Regulations on the Over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market and to analyze if the benefits of the Title VII regulations have outweighed the costs in the OTC derivatives market by reducing systematic(market) risk and protecting market participants or if the Title VII regulations’ costs have made things worse by lessening opportunities in the OTC derivatives market and stifling economics benefits by over regulating the market. This paper strives to examine this issue by explaining how OTC are said to have played a part in the 2008 Financial crisis. Next, we give a general overview of financial securities, and what OTC are. Then we will give a general overview of what the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Acts are, which are the regulations to come out of the 2008 Financial crisis. Then the paper will dive into Dodd-Frank Title VII Clearing Regulations and how they regulated OTC derivatives in the aftermath of the 2008 Financial crisis. Next, we discuss the Clearing House industry. Then the paper explores the major change of central clearing versus the previous bilateral clearing system. The paper will then cover how these rules have affected OTC derivatives market by examining the works of authors, who both support the regulations and others, who oppose the regulations by looking at logical arguments, historical evidence, and empirical evidence. Finally, we conclude that based on all the evidence how the Dodd-Frank Title VII Clearing Regulations effects on the OTC derivatives market are inconclusive at this time.

The purpose of this paper is to review the effects of the Dodd-Frank Title VII Clearing Regulations on the Over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market and to analyze if the benefits of the Title VII regulations have outweighed the costs in the OTC derivatives market by reducing systematic(market) risk and protecting market participants or if the Title VII regulations’ costs have made things worse by lessening opportunities in the OTC derivatives market and stifling economics benefits by over regulating the market. This paper strives to examine this issue by explaining how OTC are said to have played a part in the 2008 Financial crisis. Next, we give a general overview of financial securities, and what OTC are. Then we will give a general overview of what the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Acts are, which are the regulations to come out of the 2008 Financial crisis. Then the paper will dive into Dodd-Frank Title VII Clearing Regulations and how they regulated OTC derivatives in the aftermath of the 2008 Financial crisis. Next, we discuss the Clearing House industry. Then the paper explores the major change of central clearing versus the previous bilateral clearing system. The paper will then cover how these rules have affected OTC derivatives market by examining the works of authors, who both support the regulations and others, who oppose the regulations by looking at logical arguments, historical evidence, and empirical evidence. Finally, we conclude that based on all the evidence how the Dodd-Frank Title VII Clearing Regulations effects on the OTC derivatives market are inconclusive at this time.

The following thesis discusses the primary drivers of value creation in a leveraged buyout. Value creation is defined by two broad criteria: enterprise value creation and financial value creation. With enterprise value creation, the company itself may be improved, which in turn may have positive implications on the economy at large. As the analysis of enterprise value creation is outside the scope of publicly available information and data, the core focus of this thesis is financial value creation. Financial value creation is defined as the financial returns to a given private equity firm. Amongst this segment of value creation, there are roughly three primary categories responsible for generating returns: financial engineering, governance improvements, and operational improvements. The attached literature review and subsequent chapters of this thesis discuss the academic drivers of value creation and the outputs of a leveraged buyout model conducted on a public company, Schnitzer Steel, that has been determined to be an ideal candidate for a buyout.

For decades, firms and individuals have utilized written documents to aid in the negotiation of, and completion of, business transactions. One such document is known as a "letter of intent." A letter of intent is often in the form of a letter that serves to evidence preliminary discussions and aid in negotiations between parties. They are generally intended to be "non-binding," meaning neither party will be bound by terms or conditions set forth in the letter of intent unless formal documents are later prepared and executed by the parties. Letters of intent take myriad forms and names, such as "memorandum of understanding," "proposal letter," and "letter of interest." They have been used in many areas of business, including finance, real estate, and supply chain management. Parties often choose to use a letter of intent for varied benefits it may provide, memorializing preliminary discussions, establishing a timeline for negotiations, seeing whether there are any "deal breakers" among terms being proposed, confirming that a party is serious about a deal, or putting moral pressure on the other party to continue negotiations. However, letters of intent carry with them a significant level of risk, which raises the question of whether or not they should be used at all. Many of the risks associated with the use of a letter of intent stems from the potential for a court to find that a letter of intent constitutes a binding agreement, or creates a duty of the parties to continue negotiations in good faith. Parties to a letter of intent may later disagree as to whether they intended all of the terms, or a particular provision, to be legally binding and enforceable, resulting in legal action. Even if a court finds that a letter of intent does not constitute a binding contract, a party may be able to recover damages under a number of legal theories, such as breach of a duty to negotiate in good faith or promissory estoppel. The use of letters of intent is therefore risky, and ultimately, the risks may outweigh the benefits of utilizing letters of intent. This thesis studies the types, uses, benefits, and risks associated with the use of letters of intent, including an examination of statutes and cases that have been applied by courts in disputes surrounding their use. Ways to mitigate the risks of use are also examined including simple practices such as not signing a letter of intent and using a separate document for any terms which must be binding, such as a "no shop" clause. A proposed legislative solution is also discussed that would prevent letters of intent not explicitly intended to be binding and meeting statutory requirements from being enforced in court, thereby substantially reducing the risks associated with the use of letters of intent.

Reverse leveraged buyouts (RLBOs) are a common practice for private equity firms across the globe and have been on the receiving end of public scrutiny. While the performance of RLBOs has been studied in the past, very few if any works have been published concerning the specific results of reverse leveraged buyout transactions performed by the largest private equity mega-funds specifically. We collected a dataset of 22 transactions and conducted quantitative and qualitative analysis on 18 of the aforementioned transactions in order to determine the magnitude of positive effects that RLBOs had on each company. Less than half of mega-fund RLBOs that had an initial public offerings outperformed the Dow Jones Industrial Average on a compound annual growth (CAGR) basis, post-exit. Even less outperformed the S&P 500 index, and substantially less than that outperformed industry averages. It can clearly be seen that while averages dictate that large scale RLBOs do not seem profitable, there is a noticeable disparity between the success and failure of each deal when looking at price performance. This data makes the argument that while RLBOs are difficult to make successful, if the market receives them well then they can be some of the highest returning transactions.

The purpose of this paper is to study the impact that poison pills have on the value of share prices after the cancellation of a transaction. While various studies have focused on the generic share price impact of poison pills, very few have focused on the impact of poison pills in cancelled transactions. Based on our research and analysis, in cancelled transactions, target firms that have poison pills prior to the transaction and target firms without poison pills generate returns above the announcement date premium and subsequent investment in the S&P 500 when held to the cancellation of the transaction and when held from cancellation to 6 months after the transaction. This analysis can contribute to the argument that holding shares of firms regardless of cancellation risk is preferable to taking profit at announcement date. Additionally, it can contribute to the study of undiscovered pricing impact of poison pills.

We chose to analyze Apple's current cash and cash equivalents balance of $246.1 billion. To fully understand how to maximize Apple's investment using this cash balance, we performed detailed due diligence on the company. We analyzed the history of apple, a timeline of their major product releases, their financial statements, product mix, and the industries in which they operate. This allowed us to gain a deeper understanding of available opportunities. After doing our due diligence on the company, we look at their current cash levels and potential reasons that the cash balance has been increasing so quickly. Another component of their cash balance is the implications of a tax holiday for repatriation, so we also looked at the potential effects of this on Apple's cash balance. Finally, we begin the main portion of our project where look at the six potential options for the cash. We cover share buybacks, dividends or a special dividend, paying down debt, investing in research and development, making a large acquisition, or continuing to build a high cash balance. We pull data on each of these, look at financial metrics and many different numbers to evaluate which of these six options would maximize shareholder value. A large portion of our work was spent looking at acquisition targets. We finally vetted three potential targets: Tesla, Netflix, and Disney. These companies made sense for a number of different qualitative reasons, but after looking at them from a financial standpoint we concluded Disney was the only company worth modeling out. A detailed financial model was built on Disney to find a purchase price. Included in this was a discounted cash flow analysis, comparable company's analysis, analyzing precedent transactions, and then finding an enterprise value based on the model. We also built an accretion dilution model to see what the effect on earnings per share is and also what the combined entity would look like. In order to present our findings, we built a pitch book. A pitch book is the standard type of presentation that investment banks use in order to show their recommendations to companies.

I study how the density of executive labor markets affects managerial incentives and thereby firm performance. I find that U.S. executive markets are locally segmented rather than nationally integrated, and that the density of a local market provides executives with non-compensation incentives. Empirical results show that in denser labor markets, executives face stronger performance-based dismissal threats as well as better outside opportunities. These incentives result in higher firm performance in denser markets, especially when executives have longer career horizons. Using state-level variation in the enforceability of covenants not to compete, I find that the positive effects of market density on incentive alignment and firm performance are stronger in markets where executives are freer to move. This evidence further supports the argument that local labor market density works as an external incentive alignment mechanism.