Normative Consent and Epistemic Conceptions of Democracy

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This work has two major goals. The first is to reframe the problem of political authority from its Conservative framing to a Reformist framing. This change creates a new benchmark for the success of a theory. Rather than justifying a

This work has two major goals. The first is to reframe the problem of political authority from its Conservative framing to a Reformist framing. This change creates a new benchmark for the success of a theory. Rather than justifying a pre-existing intuition, a theory can be successful if it could establish political authority whenever the state itself or an individual’s relationship to it changes. This change also shifts the focus from the state’s right to rule to moral housekeeping. In other words, the main goal is not to see when the state can use coercion against its citizens but rather to determine what political obligations citizens could have under different scenarios so that citizens can more accurately keep track of their moral reasons for action. The second major goal is to call into question epistemic theories of democratic authority through a critical examination of David Estlund’s theory of normative consent. Normative consent cannot establish political authority. Even granting that it could, normative consent would bind individuals to epistemic procedures rather than democratic procedures given that epistemic procedures better solve the moral problems that generate normative consent. However, this then raises worries from the public reason perspective that epistemic procedures would impose a procedure on some citizens which they could reject from a qualified position. To overcome this worry, it is shown that epistemic procedures based on reducing the power of the ignorant rather than raising the power of the experts are not open to such qualified rejection, and democratic procedures in the real world will do no better than a coin flip at selecting correct policies. In the end, one branch of epistemic conceptions of democratic authority are proven untenable.
Date Created
2024
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The Ethics of Lockdown: The Case of China’s Zero-COVID Policy

Description

The ground for the ethics of lockdown policies has radically shifted in the past three years. Libertarians started to be convinced that it is morally justifiable to impose constraints on liberties, including forced quarantine and social isolation. On September 7,

The ground for the ethics of lockdown policies has radically shifted in the past three years. Libertarians started to be convinced that it is morally justifiable to impose constraints on liberties, including forced quarantine and social isolation. On September 7, according to the World Health Orignaztion, the mortality rate for COVID reached its lowest since March 9, 2020. I will take September 7 as the turning point for the ethics of the pandemic in this work. If we accept utilitarianism, deontology, or moral relativism, then, prior to the turning point, China’s Zero-COVID Policy was morally justified. Although China’s Zero-COVID Policy has remained controversial, I will propose that (1) the policy was justified on utilitarianism because it maximized utility, (2) the policy was justified on deontology because the policy is the Nash Equilibrium, and (3) the policy was justified on moral relativism because the policy was in accordance with the norms of the Chinese people.

Date Created
2023-05
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Virtuous and Virtual: An Analysis of the Legalization of Mobile Sports Gambling in the State of Arizona

Description

I conduct a thorough ethical analysis of the legalization of sports gambling and make suggestions as to how the statutes surrounding the act need revision in order to promote the most ethical form of mobile sports gambling, based upon concerns

I conduct a thorough ethical analysis of the legalization of sports gambling and make suggestions as to how the statutes surrounding the act need revision in order to promote the most ethical form of mobile sports gambling, based upon concerns of addiction, Native American revenue streams, and the metaphysics of sport and integrity of the game.

Date Created
2022-12
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The Personite Problem and Ethics Under Four-Dimensionalism

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Description

Four-dimensionalism is a popular philosophical view of how we persist through time. However, some philosophers, such as Mark Johnston and Eric Olson, argue that four-dimensionalism has perverse implications on our practical ethics. This is because, if four-dimensionalism is true, then

Four-dimensionalism is a popular philosophical view of how we persist through time. However, some philosophers, such as Mark Johnston and Eric Olson, argue that four-dimensionalism has perverse implications on our practical ethics. This is because, if four-dimensionalism is true, then there exist entities called personites. And if personites exist, then many of the ordinary prudential, social, and moral habits we engage in, like present self-sacrifice for future benefit, promising to do something painful in the future, or being held responsible for something the we did in the past, subjects personites to suffering without sufficient compensation, consent, or desert. And this would be immoral according to our common-sense morality. In this paper, I argue that if four-dimensionalism is true, and personites exist, then we are still morally permitted to engage in the above practices. If four-dimensionalism turns out to be true, it has no perverse implications on how we ought to live.

Date Created
2022-05
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Campaign promises: a complicated way of producing perlocutionary effects

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Description
The current landscape of political speech is ripe for deep philosophical analysis yet has not been thoroughly investigated through the lens of speech-act theory. In this space, I believe I contribute something novel to the area, namely a notion of

The current landscape of political speech is ripe for deep philosophical analysis yet has not been thoroughly investigated through the lens of speech-act theory. In this space, I believe I contribute something novel to the area, namely a notion of campaign promises that differs from standard promises that enables a new way of interpreting this kind of speech. Over the course of this paper, it is argued that Campaign Promises (CP) are non-trivially and philosophically distinct from the notion of Standard Promises (SP). There are many philosophical distinctions to draw, including moral, political and logical, but my focus is largely in philosophy of language. I engage the work of Searle, Austin and Wittgenstein among others to investigate what I take to be the following important differences from CP and SP: First, that CP and SP differ in the “best interest” condition, of the condition that a promise must be in the best interest of the promisee in order for that promise to obtain, which in turn, produces the effect of threatening those who do not want the promise to come about. Secondly, that CP serve to reinforce world views in a way that is non-trivially different from SP. To do this, I employ Wittgensteinian language game theory to bridge the gap between traditional Searlian speech act theory to more modern McGowan-style oppressive language models. Through this process I develop and defend this alternative way of understanding and evaluating CP and political speech.
Date Created
2019
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Everybody Wants to Rule the World: Comparing Democracy and Epistocracy on the Problem of Incompetence

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This paper examines the strength of a recent argument made against democracy. The notion of epistocracy, a system of government where the wise or the knowers rule, has garnered some attention of late. These theories of epistocracy have traditionally struggled

This paper examines the strength of a recent argument made against democracy. The notion of epistocracy, a system of government where the wise or the knowers rule, has garnered some attention of late. These theories of epistocracy have traditionally struggled with questions of political legitimacy and authority. In Against Democracy, Jason Brennan articulates an alternative theory for epistocracy which may prove more promising. Brennan argues instead that democracy faces objections of political legitimacy which epistocracy avoids because democracy either harms or violates rights as a result of granting political power to the incompetent. This negative argument against democracy hopes to make epistocracy the preferable option in comparison. I will argue, however, that if we take this comparative approach then we ought to prefer democracy---or, rather, democratic reform---over epistocracy as the best solution in addressing the concerns which Brennan raises. It is not enough to merely point to flaws in democracy. For this argument to be successful, it must also be shown that epistocracy avoids those flaws at an acceptable cost. I claim that, upon examination, epistocratic theories fail to make this case. Rather, it is evident from this examination that there are various institutional mechanisms available with which democracy may manage the risks and harms which might arise from imbuing the incompetent with political power. This in turn suggests ways by which we might reform democracy to achieve similar results hoped for by epistocrats without the effort, risk, and cost of tearing down and rebuilding our fundamental political institutions.
Date Created
2018
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An Exploration of Value Objectivity

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The purpose of this paper is to explore the question of whether there are objective truths about what is good and bad in a sense that extends beyond merely meeting (or failing to meet) certain pre-determined standards. An answer to

The purpose of this paper is to explore the question of whether there are objective truths about what is good and bad in a sense that extends beyond merely meeting (or failing to meet) certain pre-determined standards. An answer to this question would provide a basis for answering more specific questions, such as: Are there acts that are universally bad? Are there truths about what kinds of life are the most worth living independent of the aims people choose for themselves? Is it possible for one person to be right in the case of value disagreement in this non-pre-determined sense? If the answer to these questions is Yes, what facts make this true? Lastly, I will reflect on what conclusions this exploration warrants adopting, and their possible implications.
Date Created
2012-12
Agent

On The Desirability af Immortaliry

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Many of us regularly make decisions with the intention of living longer, healthier lives. We try to eat right, exercise, take vitamins, get checkups, and keep our bodies in general good shape. Some of the enhancements we make that are

Many of us regularly make decisions with the intention of living longer, healthier lives. We try to eat right, exercise, take vitamins, get checkups, and keep our bodies in general good shape. Some of the enhancements we make that are meant to increase the length or quality of life go even further: organ or joint replacement surgeries, cosmetic surgeries, cancer treatments, etc. These kinds of enhancements and attempts at increasing one's life, or, in some cases, the feeling or look of youth, are not the focus of this essay. These adjustments are too minor. Here I focus on the potential for significant lifespan extension (SLE), with "significant" being the operative word. For the purposes of this article, I shall define SLE as an extension to the human lifespan that is at least 100 years greater than humans 'current lifespan, which now maxes-out at about 120 years. Lifespan extension of merely a few years, say if people could live to 130 or so, would not likely result in vast personal and social differences. However, SLE promises to have more interesting and impactful potential results.
Date Created
2012-05
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Three worries about moderate deontology

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Perhaps the most common and forceful criticism directed at absolutist deontological theories is that they allow for the occurrence of morally catastrophic events whenever such events could only and certainly be prevented by the violation of a deontological constraint. Some

Perhaps the most common and forceful criticism directed at absolutist deontological theories is that they allow for the occurrence of morally catastrophic events whenever such events could only and certainly be prevented by the violation of a deontological constraint. Some deontologists simply bite the bullet, accept this implication of their theory, and give their best arguments as to why it does not undermine absolutism. Others, I think more plausibly, opt for an alternative deontological theory known as ‘moderate deontology’ and are thereby able to evade the criticism since moderate deontology permits violations of constraints under certain extreme circumstances. The goal of this thesis is to provide a defense of moderate deontology against three worries about the view, namely, that it is more accurately interpreted as a kind of pluralism than as a deontology, that there is no non-arbitrary way of setting thresholds for deontological constraints, and that the positing of thresholds for constraints would lead to some problematic results in practice. I will respond to each of these worries in turn. In particular, I will argue that moderate deontology is properly understood as a deontological theory despite its partial concern for consequentialist considerations, that thresholds for deontological constraints can be successfully located without arbitrariness by democratic appeal to people’s commonsense moral intuitions, and that the alleged problematic results of positing thresholds for constraints can be effectively explained away by the moderate deontologist.
Date Created
2017
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A defense of transitivity

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This thesis seeks to defend transitivity as a rational constraint on preferences against two putative counterexamples to transitivity. This thesis is divided into three sections. In the first section, I consider two famous and popular arguments in defense of transitivity

This thesis seeks to defend transitivity as a rational constraint on preferences against two putative counterexamples to transitivity. This thesis is divided into three sections. In the first section, I consider two famous and popular arguments in defense of transitivity and argue they are insufficient to adequately defend transitivity. I then outline a desiderata for successful arguments in defense of transitivity and identify some basic assumptions I will be making throughout the thesis. In section two, I consider the first putative counterexample to transitivity: Quinn’s Puzzle of the Self-Torturer. I offer two plausible interpretations of Quinn’s puzzle and argue that both fail. One because it does not genuinely induce intransitive preferences, and the other because the situation it requires is logically impossible. I conclude this section by defending my arguments against known objections in the literature. Finally, in the third section, I consider a counterexample to transitivity from Larry Temkin that has received little attention in the literature. I argue that while the initial counterexample is unpersuasive it can be augmented and made into a more forceful argument. I then argue that this improved counterexample fails due to some erroneous assumptions prevalent in the literature on incomparability. I conclude the thesis with a brief summary and some closing remarks.
Date Created
2015
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