The rise of China over the last two decades has left the United States switching its focus from other areas of the world to the ever growing presence and influence coming from Asia in the spectrum of world politics. Many countries in Eastern Asia are being forced to choose determine whether they want to strengthen their alliances with China, their most important economic partner, or the United States, which for most of these countries, has been their most impactful political partner. Japan has been put in the scenario of having incredibly strong ties with the United States, especially militarily, and having a long history of conflict with China, but needing to recognize the importance of China as a rising power. Simultaneously, Japan is working to increase their own global influence to match their economic strength. With the recent development in the change of Japan's constitutional self-defense and diversion from their traditional pacifist nature since adopting their constitution in 1947, the rest of the world is waiting to see what changes will be coming from Japan regarding military policy. The foreign policies that are in the relatively early development of shaping up between Japan, China and the United States that are heavily influenced by the current United States military presence in Japan and the Asian region, will have a significant impact on the global political system in the coming years.

In the sixty-seven years following the end of World War II, West Germany and Japan underwent a remarkable series of economic and social changes that irrevocably altered their respective ways of life. Formerly xenophobic, militaristic and highly socially stratified societies, both emerged from the 20th Century as liberal, prosperous and free. Both made great strides well beyond the expectations of their occupiers, and rebounded from the overwhelming destruction of their national economies within a few short decades. While these changes have yielded dramatic results, the wartime period still looms large in their respective collective memories. Therefore, an ongoing and diverse dialectical process would engage the considerable popular, official, and intellectual energy of their post-war generations. In West Germany, the term Vergangenheitsbewältigung (VGB) emerged to describe a process of coming to terms with the past, while the Japanese chose kako no kokufuku to describe their similar historical sojourns. Although intellectuals of widely varying backgrounds in both nations made great strides toward making Japanese and German citizens cognizant of the roles that their militaries played in gruesome atrocities, popular cinematic productions served to reiterate older, discredited assertions of the fundamental honor and innocence of the average soldier, thereby nurturing a historically revisionist line of reasoning that continues to compete for public attention. All forms of media would play an important role in sustaining this “apologetic narrative,” and cinema, among the most popular and visible of these mediums, was not excluded from this. Indeed, films would play a unique recurring role, like rhetorical time capsules, in offering a sanitized historical image of Japanese and German soldiers that continues to endure in modern times. Nevertheless, even as West Germany and Japan regained their sovereignty and re-examined their pasts with ever greater resolution and insight, their respective film industries continued to “reset” the clock, and accentuated the visibility and relevancy of apologetic forces still in existence within both societies. However, it is important to note that, when speaking of “Germans” and “Japanese,” that they are not meant to be thought of as being uniformly of one mind or another. Rather, the use of these words is meant as convenient shorthand to refer to the dominant forces in Japanese and German civil society at any given time over the course of their respective post- war histories. Furthermore, references to “Germany” during the Cold War period are to be understood to mean the Federal Republic of Germany, rather than their socialist counterpart, the German Democratic Republic, a nation that undertook its own coming to terms with the past in an entirely distinct fashion.

After World War II both Japanese and Germans had to come to grips with the reality of defeat. It was during this time when both countries had to develop a new identity that was able to deal with the question of war responsibility. This paper attempts to compare these two identities using history textbooks from the occupation time period while keeping in mind the delicate balance between the wishes of the occupation authorities, the approaching Cold War, and the very nature of defeat itself.

This paper explores how US Cold War nuclear testing in the Pacific Islands has been approached in three different regions \u2014affected Pacific Islands, the US, and Japan. Because the US has failed to adequately address its nuclear past in the Pacific Islands, and Pacific Islander narratives struggle to reach the international community on their own, my study considers the possibility of Pacific Islanders finding greater outlet for their perspectives within dominant Japanese narratives, which also feature nuclear memory. Whereas the US government has remained largely evasive and aloof about the consequences of its nuclear testing in the Pacific, Japan encourages active, anti-nuclear war memory that could be congruent with Pacific Islander interests. After examining historical events, surrounding context, and prevailing sentiments surrounding this issue in each region however, my study finds that even within Japanese narratives, Pacific Islander narratives can only go so far because of Japan's own nuclear power industry, its hierarchical relationship with the Pacific Islands, and Japan's strong ties to the US in what can be interpreted as enduring Cold War politics.

This dissertation describes the public sphere that coalesced in the Soviet jazz scene during Josef Stalin’s reign. Scholars debate the extent to which Soviet citizens, especially under Stalin, were coerced into cooperating with the regime through terror; willingly cooperated with the regime out of self-interest; or re-aligned their speech, behavior, and thoughts to conform to Bolshevik ideology and discourse. In all cases, citizens were generally unable to openly express their own opinions on what Soviet society should look like. In this dissertation, I attempt to bridge this gap by analyzing the diverse reactions to jazz music in Josef Stalin’s Soviet Union. I argue that audience engagement with jazz and discussions about the genre in the Soviet press and elsewhere were attempts to grapple with bigger questions of public concern about leisure, morality, ethnicity, cosmopolitanism and patriotism in a socialist society. This jazz public sphere was suppressed in the late 1940s and early 1950s because of Cold War paranoia and fears of foreign influences in Soviet life. In its place, a counterpublic sphere formed, in which jazz enthusiasts expressed views on socialism that were more open and contradictory to official norms. This counterpublic sphere foreshadowed aspects of post-Stalinist Soviet culture. To support my arguments, I employ archival documents such as fan mail and censorship records, periodicals, memoirs, and Stalin-era jazz recordings to determine the themes present in jazz music, how audiences reacted to them, and how these popular reactions overlapped with those of journalists, musicologists, bureaucrats, and composers. This project expands our understanding of when and where public spheres can form, challenges top-down interpretations of Soviet cultural policy, and illuminates the Soviet Union and Russia’s ambivalent relationship with the West and its culture.