In 2016, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) imposed on managers a responsibility to evaluate their companies’ forward-looking prospects for continuing as a going concern on a quarterly basis. Prior to this change, the responsibility of assessing the future of a company was only required annually by the external auditor through auditing standards. If this increase in management responsibility induced managers to implement a process and controls to obtain forward-looking information for disclosure, I would expect this information acquisition process to also improve overall financial reporting quality. I find that financial reporting quality increased for firms after Accounting Standards Update (ASU) 2014-15, as evidenced by less restatements. Additionally, while I find the timeliness of information decreased, as evidenced by slower earnings announcements, the decrease is not economically meaningful. Lastly, I find the effect of the standard change on financial reporting quality is greater for non-financially healthy companies who have to perform a more extensive analysis under ASU 2014-15. While the purpose of the accounting standard was to reduce diversity in the timing and content of going concern disclosures, I find evidence of other benefits with little costs that this standard had on firm’s financial reporting.

This study examines the effect of outside wealth on executives’ risk-taking in financial reporting. To investigate this question, I hand-collect data on Chief Financial Officers’ (CFO) real estate assets and use housing returns as a proxy for CFOs’ outside wealth changes. I find that CFOs who experience a large negative housing return become less aggressive in financial reporting, as evidenced by a lower likelihood of restatement. Additional tests show that this effect is driven by CFOs who have less diversified wealth portfolios, by younger CFOs, and by CFOs with more leveraged houses, suggesting that the reduced risk-taking behavior of CFOs stems from decreased diversification of personal wealth and increased career concerns after a negative shock to outside wealth. These findings highlight the important role of executive outside wealth in explaining their risk-taking behaviors.

An audit increases the credibility of financial reports by reducing the uncertainty in financial information. A change of auditor will prompt investors to reevaluate this uncertainty. I examine the association between auditor changes and the pricing of information risk using the Fama-French asset pricing model augmented with accounting- based information risk factors. On average, I find that the pricing of information risk decreases after an auditor change, suggesting that investors are less concerned about information risk after an auditor change. However, for auditor changes that involve auditor resignations, disagreements, and movements away from a Big 4 auditor, I find an increase in the pricing of information risk, implying that these changes are associated with a weakened information environment. I also show that market returns surrounding the change announcement are correlated with the future change in perceived information risk. My study contributes to the debate surrounding mandatory auditor rotation and auditor tenure by suggesting that not all auditor changes are perceived the same way by investors.

A Chief Audit Executive (CAE) is the leader of a company’s internal audit function. Because there is no mandated disclosure requirement for the internal audit structure, little is understood about the influence of a CAE on a company. Following the logic that a CAE disclosed in SEC filings is more influential in a company’s oversight function, I identify an influential CAE using the disclosure of the role. I then examine the association between an influential CAE and monitoring outcomes. Using data hand collected from SEC filings for S&P 1500 companies from 2004 to 2015, I find companies that have an influential CAE are generally larger, older, and have a larger corporate board. More importantly, I find that an influential CAE in NYSE-listed companies is associated with higher internal control quality. This association is stronger for companies that reference a CAE’s direct interaction with the audit committee. This study provides an initial investigation into a common, but little understood position in corporate oversight.

This case study sought to comparatively analyze well-publicized auditor-client lawsuits between the years 2008 and 2018. The five lawsuits were all filed following the events on the Financial Crisis of 2008. This was done as the 2008 Financial Crisis signified a turning point in many prominent financial firms and the modern day economic landscape. With focus on the Big 4 Auditing firms as the defendants, the findings of this paper will allow for further analysis into the most critical aspects of these types of lawsuits. Specifically, pertaining to the cases’ both similar and dissimilar components. The five cases analyzed in this paper found common factors pertaining to the role of bankruptcy, as well as the role of the In Pari Delicto Doctrine in the defense strategy. Upon summary, it was determined the most successful iteration of the doctrine occurred in those cases where the strategy was combined with other laws and precedents. Furthermore, it was determined the failure of the doctrine in initial court proceedings such as, the motion to dismiss and the motion for summary judgement, lead to instances of settlement. Additionally, the cases primarily involved fraudulent activities or accounting errors, and focused on the role of the auditor in the collapse of the various clients’ firms. In the case of accounting errors, cases typically ended in settlement as well. After careful analysis, it can be inferred cases involving fraudulent behavior on the part of the clients, have a substantial impact on the successful utilization of the In Pari Delicto Doctrine. In the future, the scope of this case study can be expanded beyond well-publicized lawsuits.

The United States is arguably the most powerful country in the world boasting the largest GDP and yet there are over half a million homeless Americans as of November 2015. While traditional solutions to combat homelessness adequately assist the majority of people experiencing homelessness as a short-term issue, traditional solutions do not serve the complex needs of the chronically homeless. One creative solution being applied across the nation to end chronic homelessness is Housing First. This report assesses the feasibility of a Housing First program in Tucson Arizona to reduce unsheltered rates. It discusses the current state of homelessness across the nation and in Tucson, explains the existing methods used to reduce unsheltered rates and explores the cost and benefits of implementing such a program. This report concludes with recommendations for implementing a Housing First program in Tucson, Arizona.