CFO Outside Wealth and Financial Reporting Aggressiveness: Evidence from Real Estate Shocks

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Description
This study examines the effect of outside wealth on executives’ risk-taking in financial reporting. To investigate this question, I hand-collect data on Chief Financial Officers’ (CFO) real estate assets and use housing returns as a proxy for CFOs’ outside wealth

This study examines the effect of outside wealth on executives’ risk-taking in financial reporting. To investigate this question, I hand-collect data on Chief Financial Officers’ (CFO) real estate assets and use housing returns as a proxy for CFOs’ outside wealth changes. I find that CFOs who experience a large negative housing return become less aggressive in financial reporting, as evidenced by a lower likelihood of restatement. Additional tests show that this effect is driven by CFOs who have less diversified wealth portfolios, by younger CFOs, and by CFOs with more leveraged houses, suggesting that the reduced risk-taking behavior of CFOs stems from decreased diversification of personal wealth and increased career concerns after a negative shock to outside wealth. These findings highlight the important role of executive outside wealth in explaining their risk-taking behaviors.
Date Created
2023
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Mutual Fund Liquidity Management, Stock Liquidity, and Corporate Disclosure

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Description
This study presents the first evidence that mutual fund liquidity management affects both stock liquidity and information disclosure of portfolio firms. Using a difference-in-differences approach that exploits a proposal by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as an exogenous

This study presents the first evidence that mutual fund liquidity management affects both stock liquidity and information disclosure of portfolio firms. Using a difference-in-differences approach that exploits a proposal by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as an exogenous shock to mutual fund liquidity management, I find causal evidence that mutual fund liquidity management improves liquidity of underlying stocks. The liquidity improvement is more pronounced when mutual funds have stronger incentives to improve portfolio liquidity and more resources to influence firms, and when portfolio firms have lower stock liquidity and higher information asymmetry prior to the SEC proposal. I further show that mutual funds may exert pressure on portfolio firms to improve their disclosure as a channel to improve stock liquidity. Overall, the results indicate that liquidity management at the fund level has important implications for stock liquidity and information disclosure of portfolio firms.
Date Created
2020
Agent

Short Selling Threats and Non-GAAP Reporting: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

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Description
This study examines how short selling threats affect firms’ non-generally accepted accounting principles (non-GAAP) reporting quality. From 2005 to 2007, the SEC implemented a Pilot Program under Regulation SHO, in which one-third of the Russell 3000 index stocks were randomly

This study examines how short selling threats affect firms’ non-generally accepted accounting principles (non-GAAP) reporting quality. From 2005 to 2007, the SEC implemented a Pilot Program under Regulation SHO, in which one-third of the Russell 3000 index stocks were randomly chosen as pilot stocks and exempted from short-sale price tests. As a result, short selling threats increased considerably for pilot stocks. Using difference-in-differences tests, I find that pilot firms respond to the increased short selling threats by reducing the use of low-quality non-GAAP exclusions, resulting in an improvement in the quality of overall non-GAAP exclusions. Further tests show that this effect of short selling threats is more pronounced for smaller firms, firms with lower institutional ownership, firms with lower analyst coverage, and firms with lower ratios of fundamental value to market value. These findings suggest short sellers play an important monitoring role in disciplining managers, as evidenced by the non-GAAP reporting choices of managers.
Date Created
2020
Agent

Does a Chief Audit Executive Matter? Evidence from Corporate Disclosure of the Position

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Description
A Chief Audit Executive (CAE) is the leader of a company’s internal audit function. Because there is no mandated disclosure requirement for the internal audit structure, little is understood about the influence of a CAE on a company. Following the

A Chief Audit Executive (CAE) is the leader of a company’s internal audit function. Because there is no mandated disclosure requirement for the internal audit structure, little is understood about the influence of a CAE on a company. Following the logic that a CAE disclosed in SEC filings is more influential in a company’s oversight function, I identify an influential CAE using the disclosure of the role. I then examine the association between an influential CAE and monitoring outcomes. Using data hand collected from SEC filings for S&P 1500 companies from 2004 to 2015, I find companies that have an influential CAE are generally larger, older, and have a larger corporate board. More importantly, I find that an influential CAE in NYSE-listed companies is associated with higher internal control quality. This association is stronger for companies that reference a CAE’s direct interaction with the audit committee. This study provides an initial investigation into a common, but little understood position in corporate oversight.
Date Created
2019
Agent

Does Credit Supply Competition Affect Accounting Conservatism?

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Description
This study investigates the relation between credit supply competition among banks and their clients’ conditional accounting conservatism (i.e., asymmetric timely loss recognition). The Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) of 1994 permits banks and bank holding companies to expand

This study investigates the relation between credit supply competition among banks and their clients’ conditional accounting conservatism (i.e., asymmetric timely loss recognition). The Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) of 1994 permits banks and bank holding companies to expand their business across state lines, introducing a positive shock to credit supply competition in the banking industry. The increase in credit supply competition weakens banks’ bargaining power in the negotiation process, which in turn may weaken their ability to demand conservative financial reporting from borrowers. Consistent with this prediction, results show that firms report less conservatively after the IBBEA is passed in their headquartered states. The effect of the IBBEA on conditional conservatism is particularly stronger for firms in states with a greater increase in competition among banks, firms whose operations are more concentrated in their headquarter states, firms with greater financial constraints, and firms subject to less external monitoring. Robustness tests confirm that the observed decline in conditional conservatism is causally related to the passage of IBBEA. Overall, this study highlights the impact of credit supply competition on financial reporting practices.
Date Created
2018
Agent

Short Selling Pressure, Stock Price Behavior, and Management Forecast Precision: Evidence From a Natural Experiment

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Description

Using a natural experiment (Regulation SHO), we show that short selling pressure and consequent stock price behavior have a causal effect on managers’ voluntary disclosure choices. Specifically, we find that managers respond to a positive exogenous shock to short selling

Using a natural experiment (Regulation SHO), we show that short selling pressure and consequent stock price behavior have a causal effect on managers’ voluntary disclosure choices. Specifically, we find that managers respond to a positive exogenous shock to short selling pressure and price sensitivity to bad news by reducing the precision of bad news forecasts. This finding on management forecasts appears to be generalizable to other corporate disclosures. In particular, we find that, in response to increased short selling pressure, managers also reduce the readability (or increase the fuzziness) of bad news annual reports. Overall, our results suggest that maintaining the current level of stock prices is an important consideration in managers’ strategic disclosure decisions.

Date Created
2015-03-01
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