In this dissertation, I investigate the causes of differences in the use of suicide terror by non-state armed groups, including magnitude of use, targeting decisions, and how reliant groups are on suicide attacks. I develop and test the propositions that the age of groups and the capability of the state military they face significantly impact the scale of use and targeting selection of their suicide attacks. Older groups are predicted to carry out a decreased number of suicide attacks in comparison with younger groups, but increase their focus on attacking hard targets and decrease their focus on attacking soft targets, due to older groups being more likely to possess skilled terror operatives and to follow traditional guerrilla warfare practices. Groups that began using suicide terror later in their existence are predicted to carry out less suicide attacks than groups that adopt the tactic earlier in their histories, due to organizations having increased reliance on established practices and procedures. Groups fighting strong state militaries are predicted to carry out more suicide attacks, a higher proportion of attacks on soft targets, and be more reliant on suicide terror than are groups fighting weak militaries, as increased military pressure on groups decreases the effectiveness of their individual attacks, reduces their ability to train skilled operatives, and increases their desperation and incentive to use unconventional tactics. I conduct a quantitative analysis of 140 groups from 1998-2012 and find that older groups and groups that adopt suicide terror later in their existence carry out less suicide attacks than younger groups and groups that adopt suicide terror earlier in their histories. I also find that groups respond to increases in state military personnel by carrying out more suicide attacks overall, a higher proportion of suicide attacks against soft targets, a lower proportion against hard targets, and by becoming more reliant on suicide terror. These dynamics are also illustrated in depth through case study analysis of suicide terror campaigns by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)/Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which represent two distinct models of suicide terror.

This dissertation grapples with the dynamics of intractable conflicts, especially those fought on religious grounds. Intractable conflicts are conceptualized as those which are particularly resistant to resolution. They tend to widen in scope, grow in destructive intensity, and even lengthen in duration. Traditional conflict resolution techniques such as negotiation and mediation fail to manage or resolve such conflicts. Tangible issues with intangible salience are difficult to be resolved peacefully. Disagreements over religion have intangible significance, meaning they are difficult or impossible to define, understand and divide. They result in indivisible bargains, which subsequently lead to intense, persistent and hence, intractable conflicts. Existing literature mostly compares religious and non-religious conflicts and overlook the variations within religious conflicts, especially among different religious causes and their effects on conflict intractability. Operationalizing intractable conflicts in terms of their intensity and duration, I concentrate on conflicts between two world religions – Hinduism and Islam in India. Using the Varshney-Wilkinson Dataset on Hindu-Muslim Violence in India (1950-1995) and Mitra and Ray’s (2014) extension of the same dataset (1996-2000), I classify religious conflicts into four types – (1) Conflicts over Sacred Sites, (2) Animal Slaughter, (3) Religious Festivities and (4) Mixed. I hypothesize that compared to the latter three conflicts, any conflict that involves Sacred Sites results in greater intensity and duration and hence, will be the most intractable. Moreover, in comparison to non-religious conflicts, the same holds true. My findings confirm these hypotheses and additionally demonstrate the varied effects that each of these types have on conflict intensity and duration.

Third-party diplomatic support for protest movements has become an increasingly important tool for international actors in order to inform and influence foreign publics, especially, discontented citizens. Expressing official support for protest campaigns -through condemning government repression, encouraging political reform, praising protesters, and sympathizing with them- or imposing economic sanctions because of the host government's repressive behavior is now a significant component of diplomacy. Despite the growing importance of third-party diplomatic support for protest movements, little systematic research has been conducted on its causes and consequence. This study includes three interrelated papers to address this gap in the literature. The first paper addresses the question of why countries provide diplomatic support for protest movements. Focusing on Western diplomacy in the post-Cold War era, I argue that there are two reasons why Western democracies take diplomatic actions in support of protest campaigns. First, when the host government uses extreme violence against protesters; and second when the host government has an oppositional stance toward the U.S.-led liberal international order. I use original data of 523 diplomatic actions from 1990 to 2019 to test these theoretical expectations. The second paper asks whether and under what conditions diplomatic support is effective. I argue that diplomatic support is likely to reduce popular support or protest movements when it occurs alongside protesters' call for international help because it makes governments' common claim on the alleged coordination between opposition figures and foreign countries credible. I conduct a survey experiment among Iranian intelligentsia to test this argument. The results support the theoretical model. The third chapter asks whether the identity of supporter could make a difference in the public's attitudes toward protest movements. The central argument is that support from strategic allies is likely to weaken public support for protest campaigns. However, when diplomatic support comes from allies, it is likely to increase support for protesters. I test this theory by conducting a survey experiment of 1800 American citizens on the Black Lives Matter Movement. The findings show that the identity of supporters plays a crucial role in shaping public attitudes toward protest movements.

How do religion and ethnicity shape the sustainability of peace after civil wars? Ethnic and religious conflicts have been rising in prevalence over the last half-century, generating larger headlines as they influence every corner of the world. These conflicts occur across faiths, sects, and nations, and they appear to reignite in intervals, devolving into conflict again and again with spells of relative peace in between. With some notable exceptions, previous research on conflict recurrence has focused primarily on either ethnicity or religion, resulting in limited understanding of the ways that religion and ethnicity may interact. Moreover, many studies simplify the study of religion, ethnicity, and conflict by reducing it to an issue of shared identity, i.e., whether the two warring parties are from the same nominal religious or ethnic group. This project explores the role that religion and ethnicity play in three major causes of conflict recurrence: post-war autonomy, peacetime discrimination, and territorial claims. The primary argument is that religious and ethnic identities drive conflict recurrence through territorial claims, achieving autonomy, and their reactions to discrimination. Using a stratified Cox Proportional Hazard model, I analyze global data on all post-intrastate armed conflict peace years between 1980 and 2006. The results suggest that the indivisibility of territory in religious conflicts makes conflict more likely to recur, but only in cases where the fundamental question at hand is the role of religion in government. In addition, conflicts organized around ethnicity are increasingly unlikely to respond to discrimination by returning to war. The extreme scarcity of post-war autonomy arrangements rendered robust conclusions about its effect difficult to discern.

Civil conflicts with ethnic motivating factors are more likely to experience recurrence than nonethnic conflicts. In this paper I conduct a survival analysis on a group of 175 conflict episodes from 1946-2005. I argue that grievances based on religion, race, culture, language, and/or history are difficult to resolve due to the concept of indivisibility that makes compromise on ethnic issues unpopular. Along with Clausewitz’s theory on the influence of passion, chance, and reason in war, I also argue the importance of following clear objectives. When goals change over time, strategy becomes confounded and conflict recurrence increases. Utilizing the Cox Proportional Hazards model, the hazard rate is found to be significantly higher for ethnic conflicts than nonethnic conflicts. They also face shorter periods of peace. To highlight how ethnic mechanisms effect similar conflict scenarios, a case study of the first Indo-Pakistani and Chinese Civil War is made. I find that in the absence of ethnic grievances through China’s cultural assimilation campaigns, they were able to effectively curb violent disputes while India could not.

In this dissertation i argue that the internet has a positive impact on the likelihood of ethnic riots. To make this argument I put forward three major claims. First, ethnic riots are best understood as performances that aim to clarify ambiguities in the social order. Second, communication technologies structurally constrain the flow of information passing through them. Third, the internet is unique among modern Information Communication Technologies in its capacity for inducing ethnic riots. I provide two types of empirical evidence to support these claims: a cross-national analysis of internet penetration and a case study of India. The former provides evidence for the central claim, finding that the internet has a positive effect on the likelihood of ethnic conflict after a threshold of internet penetration is met. The latter sketches the limits of the proposed theory, finding that internet penetration decreased the likelihood of ethnic riots in India. I argue this is a result of welfare contextualization of the internet.

The purpose of this thesis is to study the happiest countries in the world and see what factors, laws, and values they have in common. I will be focusing on the Scandinavian countries, as they rank highest according to the World Happiness Report. First, I will research these countries to learn more about their political, economic, educational, legal, and social landscapes. Then I will interview individuals from these countries on their views as well as values and thoughts on their country. Finally, I will compare and analyze this information to come to a conclusion to see if there are similar factors that allow these countries to be ranked so highly in the department of happiness. After reading this the reader can take away ideas of how to improve their happiness as well as new perspectives on other countries.

This thesis paper discusses the interplay between the intelligence community and the United Nations (UN) governing body, namely the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in the detection and dismantlement of undeclared weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. With the intelligence community uncovering almost all of the clandestine nuclear programs that have occurred in the world, it is important to ask if the intelligence community has an inappropriate amount of power over an objective UN structure. The cases of Iraq and Libya are used to highlight the relationship between major intelligence agencies and the IAEA as well as the existence of intermediary agencies created by the UN in special cases. The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) were both created to ensure Iraq's compliance with international weapons regulations. These appeared to be entirely autonomous and objective, which may have clashed with the intelligence community. However, research has proven that UNSCOM faced criticism for its connection to US intelligence agencies which UNMOVIC attempted to correct. Yet, the US was still able to utilize false intelligence that allowed them to internally justify a preemptive strike on Iraq. This disproven intelligence eventually ostracized the US intelligence community. The clear disregard for the expertise of the IAEA and the disapproval of the UN delegitimized both institutions. When Libya decided to dismantle its weapons programs, it answered to President Bush in the US and Prime Minister Blair in the UK. These communities kept the Libyan cooperation from the UN and IAEA until it could benefit their own nations. This type of power delegitimizes the UN regime and destabilizes an objective system. The ensuing struggle for jurisdiction and mandate confusion exemplified the confusion between a strong intelligence community and an unbiased international regime.

Civil society, when taken as a whole, is a complex phenomenon that incorporates several movements and can be accompanied with international support. For instance in 1987, 40 NGOs (non-governmental organizations) were registered by the government, and within 25 years, the number has increased to 300,000 in the present day Russian Federation. These numbers only include registered organizations, and do not count unregistered organizations, as approved under article 3 "Public organizations...can function without state registration and acquiring of the rights of registered legal body," or organizations that have been refused registration, such as the "Marriage Equality Russia" NGO that was denied registration in 2010. Thus the total amount of NGOs is significantly higher than 300,000. Every one of these NGOs "contribute to Russia‘s economic, political and social life in numerous ways and provide opportunities for citizens to help create better communities and elevate their voices" ("USAID in Russia"). With hundreds of thousands of organizations attempting to make a better society, they are creating a Russian civil society, one that could use the experience of countries with already well-established civil societies (Walzer). Walzer, however, notes the importance for civil society of political engagement with the state (317). In this thesis, I argue that the LGBT movement in Russia today has set an important example for other groups in civil society through its willingness to take on the Russian state through demonstrations and to use the state through the EU Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.