In this dissertation, I investigate the causes of differences in the use of suicide terror by non-state armed groups, including magnitude of use, targeting decisions, and how reliant groups are on suicide attacks. I develop and test the propositions that the age of groups and the capability of the state military they face significantly impact the scale of use and targeting selection of their suicide attacks. Older groups are predicted to carry out a decreased number of suicide attacks in comparison with younger groups, but increase their focus on attacking hard targets and decrease their focus on attacking soft targets, due to older groups being more likely to possess skilled terror operatives and to follow traditional guerrilla warfare practices. Groups that began using suicide terror later in their existence are predicted to carry out less suicide attacks than groups that adopt the tactic earlier in their histories, due to organizations having increased reliance on established practices and procedures. Groups fighting strong state militaries are predicted to carry out more suicide attacks, a higher proportion of attacks on soft targets, and be more reliant on suicide terror than are groups fighting weak militaries, as increased military pressure on groups decreases the effectiveness of their individual attacks, reduces their ability to train skilled operatives, and increases their desperation and incentive to use unconventional tactics. I conduct a quantitative analysis of 140 groups from 1998-2012 and find that older groups and groups that adopt suicide terror later in their existence carry out less suicide attacks than younger groups and groups that adopt suicide terror earlier in their histories. I also find that groups respond to increases in state military personnel by carrying out more suicide attacks overall, a higher proportion of suicide attacks against soft targets, a lower proportion against hard targets, and by becoming more reliant on suicide terror. These dynamics are also illustrated in depth through case study analysis of suicide terror campaigns by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)/Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which represent two distinct models of suicide terror.

This dissertation develops a theory on the strategic interaction between civilians and combatants in war zones. It builds on the emerging field of research on noncombatant self-protection mechanisms in civil wars and addresses two questions: first, once civilians have decided to organize a resistance campaign, why do they choose armed or unarmed methods of struggle? Second, how do armed groups respond to this challenge? Regarding resistance strategies, I argue norms against the use of violence determine the content of a campaign when a community depends on an external ally to organize the mobilization and such an actor has strong preferences for peaceful activism. Strategic factors (e.g., rebels’ reputation) are determinant when norm entrepreneurs are absent or fail to influence the community. Concerning groups’ reaction to a resistance campaign, the dissertation conducts one of the first comparisons of the effectiveness of these strategies. To do so, it advances a typology that distinguishes between moderate (i.e., protests) and radical strategies (either unarmed or armed self-protection) and proposes two game-theoretic models of the civilian-combatant interaction in war zones. These models predict that rebels are more likely to repress radical rather than moderate strategies. The dissertation tests this theory with statistical methods and a novel dataset on resistance campaigns in Colombia (1985-2005). It explores the Catholic Church's promotion of peaceful activism against the war in this country and tests the theory on the civilian choice of strategy with multilevel multinomial models. This empirical method yields robust evidence to the theory: when encountering a rebel group with a negative reputation, civilians are more likely to organize violent self-protection rather than peaceful activism. In contrast, when there is a powerful third party with the leverage and resolution to promote nonviolent action, civilians are more willing to undertake a peaceful mobilization rather than create a militia. The empirical expectations concerning the warring parties’ reaction to civilian dissent are examined with methods for causal inference with panel data. The dissertation corroborates that protests can compel insurgents to make concessions to the population. In contrast, rebels tend to harshly retaliate against communities that escalate a campaign with violent tactics.

Third-party diplomatic support for protest movements has become an increasingly important tool for international actors in order to inform and influence foreign publics, especially, discontented citizens. Expressing official support for protest campaigns -through condemning government repression, encouraging political reform, praising protesters, and sympathizing with them- or imposing economic sanctions because of the host government's repressive behavior is now a significant component of diplomacy. Despite the growing importance of third-party diplomatic support for protest movements, little systematic research has been conducted on its causes and consequence. This study includes three interrelated papers to address this gap in the literature. The first paper addresses the question of why countries provide diplomatic support for protest movements. Focusing on Western diplomacy in the post-Cold War era, I argue that there are two reasons why Western democracies take diplomatic actions in support of protest campaigns. First, when the host government uses extreme violence against protesters; and second when the host government has an oppositional stance toward the U.S.-led liberal international order. I use original data of 523 diplomatic actions from 1990 to 2019 to test these theoretical expectations. The second paper asks whether and under what conditions diplomatic support is effective. I argue that diplomatic support is likely to reduce popular support or protest movements when it occurs alongside protesters' call for international help because it makes governments' common claim on the alleged coordination between opposition figures and foreign countries credible. I conduct a survey experiment among Iranian intelligentsia to test this argument. The results support the theoretical model. The third chapter asks whether the identity of supporter could make a difference in the public's attitudes toward protest movements. The central argument is that support from strategic allies is likely to weaken public support for protest campaigns. However, when diplomatic support comes from allies, it is likely to increase support for protesters. I test this theory by conducting a survey experiment of 1800 American citizens on the Black Lives Matter Movement. The findings show that the identity of supporters plays a crucial role in shaping public attitudes toward protest movements.

A growing body of literature has sought to explain the nature and effects of conflict-related sexualized violence. However, a critical problem that persists concerns why wartime rape varies both within and across conflicts. Political science literature mainly addresses these questions of variation in sexualized violence through group-level or structural explanations. Yet, clear patterns of combatant non-participation in conflict-related sexualized violence is apparent, even in cases where sexual violence is severe and pervasive. What allows one combatant to refrain, while another combatant, even within the same combat unit, perpetrates sexualized violence? In this dissertation, I argue that critical differences concerning attitudes, beliefs, and motivations exist between individual combatants. In light of these differences, I reintroduce the individual combatant onto the theoretical map as a critical unit of analysis and I explore the implications of gender inequality as an important and relevant factor related to sexualized violence in political conflict. Drawing on findings from social psychology, political psychology, sociology, and political science, the theory developed argues that combatants differentially internalize important norms related to gender that become particularly activated based on primarily externalized contextual influences. To test the theory, I conduct a mixed-method, sub-national comparative analysis of combatants and attitudes and beliefs associated with gender inequality during the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995). I rely on qualitative data generated from semi-structured, comprehensive interviews with psychologists, victim’s advocates, and legal experts managing sexual violence war crimes cases, and combat veterans directly associated with the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995) to assess differences at the individual-level of analysis. To additionally determine the broader effects of gender inequality, I employ an ordered probit regression analysis to ascertain the relationship between gender inequality related to institutional health and education factors and the severity of wartime rape. The combined results of these analyses demonstrate that individual differences between combatants better predicts the likelihood of a combatant to commit sexualized violence compared to structural or institutional accounts alone.

This dissertation proposes a theory of authoritarian control of the armed forces using the economic theory of the firm. To establish a “master-servant” relationship, an organization structures governance as a long-term contractual agreement to mitigate the vulnerabilities associated with uncertainty and bilateral dependency. The bargaining power for civilian and military actors entering a contractual relationship is assessed by two dimensions: the negotiated political property rights and the credible guarantee of those rights. These dimensions outline four civil-military institutional arrangements or army types (cartel, cadre, entrepreneur, and patron armies) in an authoritarian system. In the cycle of repression, the more the dictator relies on the military for repression to stay in office, the more negotiated political property rights obtained by the military; and the more rights obtained by the military the less civilian control. Thus, the dependence on coercive violence entails a paradox for the dictator—the agents empowered to manage violence are also empowered to act against the regime. To minimize this threat, the dictator may choose to default on the political bargain through coup-proofing strategies at the cost to the regime’s credibility and reputation, later impacting a military’s decision to defend, defect, or coup during times of crisis. The cycle of repression captures the various stages in the life-cycle of the political contract between the regime and the armed forces providing insights into institutional changes governing the relationship. As such, this project furthers our understanding of the complexities of authoritarian civil–military relations and contributes conceptual tools for future studies.

ABSTRACT

Although the US government has been using remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), more commonly referred to as drones, to conduct military strikes against terrorists and insurgents since at least 2001, only around 2011 did media outlets and polling organizations began assessing the attitudes of Americans towards the use of drones as a weapon of war. Initially, public support for drone strikes was robust with nearly 70 percent of Americans expressing approval. As the discussion of drone strikes intensified however, public support declined over 10 percentage points.

Only a handful of studies have examined public opinion and drone strikes, and all have focused exclusively on explaining support. This study seeks to fill this gap in the literature and explain opposition to drone strikes. The primary argument put forth in this dissertation is that people’s beliefs determine their opinions, and their morality determines their beliefs. Although independent opinion formation is often considered a cognitive process, I argue that, at least in the case of drone strikes, the opinion formation process is largely an affective one.

By examining media coverage and elite discourse surrounding drone strikes, I isolate three narratives which I believe communicate certain messages to the public regarding drone strikes. I argue that the messages produced by elite discourse and disseminated by the media to the public are only influential on opinion formation once they have been converted to beliefs. I further argue that conversion of message to belief is largely dependent on individual moral attitudes.

To test my arguments, I conduct a survey-experiment using subjects recruited from Arizona State University’s School of Politics and Global Studies student subject pool. My research findings lead to two key conclusions. First, opposition to drone strikes is largely the product of the belief(s) that drone strikes are not necessary for protecting the United States from terrorist attack, and that drone strikes kill more civilians than do strikes from conventional aircraft. Second, whether an individual expresses support or opposition to drone strikes, moral attitudes are a relatively good predictor of both beliefs and disposition.

This thesis seeks to analyze the phenomenon of increasing multipolarity in the global environment vis-à-vis the conduct of humanitarian intervention. Established powers, including the United States and United Kingdom, and rising, predominantly developing states seem at odds over where to intervene, when, and on what basis. Situating this conflict within the responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine, which has been the guiding international framework for intervention over the past decade-and-a-half, the research answers whether the processes of multipolarity will ultimately lead to the reconciliation of nation-state interests (cooperation) or unreconciled divergence (competition). Using United Nations Security Council resolutions to temporally track multipolarity and map nations’ language into the rhetorical spaces of humanitarianism and inclinations toward intervention, the research finds support for the proposition that concepts of humanitarian intervention between great and rising powers are more conflictual. Furthermore, nations appear to be clustering into “camps” along broadly humanitarian/interventionist and state sovereigntist lines. To preserve humanitarian intervention in a more multipolar world, its proponents must accommodate diverse nation-state interests, facilitate improved relations among the member states of the U.N. Security Council, and empower regional bodies as partners in alleviating conflict under an R2P mandate.

What explains why governments and militaries pursue accountability against some human rights violations committed by members of their armed forces during ongoing conflicts, but not other violations? Further, what are the consequences of such prosecutions for their military and governmental objectives? The theory put forth by this study suggests that rather than only the natural outcome of strong rule of law, domestic prosecutions within a state’s security apparatus represents a strategic choice made by political and military actors. I employ a strategic actor approach to the pursuit of accountability, suggesting that the likelihood of accountability increases when elites perceive they will gain politically or militarily from such actions. I investigate these claims using both qualitative and quantitative methods in a comparative study across the United States and the United Kingdom. This project contributes to interdisciplinary scholarly research relevant to human rights studies, human rights law, political science, democratic state-building, democratic governance, elite decision making, counter-insurgency, protests, international sanctions, and conflict resolution. Particularly, this dissertation speaks to the intersection of strategy and law, or “lawfare” a method of warfare where law is used as means of realizing a military objective (Dunlap 2001). It provides generalizable results extending well beyond the cases analyzed. Thus, the results of this project will interest those dealing with questions relating to legitimacy, human rights, and elite decision making throughout the democratic world.

This study asks the question: does gender-based discrimination exists within Arizona State University's Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), and if so, what are the effects of such discrimination? Within this study, discrimination is defined as: the treatment or consideration of, or making a distinction in favor of or against, a person or thing based on the group, class, or category to which that person or thing belongs, rather than on individual merit. The researcher predicted that this study would show that gender-based discrimination operates within the masculine military culture of Army ROTC at ASU, resulting from women's hyper-visibility and evidenced by their lack of positive recognition and disbelief in having a voice in the program. These expectations were based on background research claiming that the token status of women in military roles causes them to be more heavily scrutinized, and they consequentially try to attain success by adapting to the masculine military culture by which they are constantly measured. For the purposes of this study, success is defined as: the attainment of wealth, favor, or eminence . This study relies on exploratory interviews and an online survey conducted with male and female Army ROTC cadets of all grade levels at Arizona State University. The interviews and survey collected demographic information and perspectives on individual experiences to establish an understanding of privilege and marginalization within the program. These results do support the prediction that women in Army ROTC at ASU face discrimination based on their unique visibility and lack of positive recognition and voice in the program. Likewise, the survey results indicate that race also has a significant impact on one's experience in Army ROTC, which is discussed later in this study in regard to needs for future research. ASU Army ROTC includes approximately 100 cadets, and approximately 30-40 of those cadets participated in this study. Additionally, the University of Arizona and the Northern Arizona University Army ROTC programs were invited to participate in this study and declined to do so, which would have offered a greater sample population. Nonetheless, the results of this research will be useful for analysis and further discussion of gender-equality in Army ROTC at Arizona State University.

Conflict minerals are those that are taken from violent, militia controlled mines in areas like the Democratic Republic of the Congo and used in technology such as laptops, cellphones, and computers. They are then sold to fund bloody wars that have been raging for years. The issue of conflict minerals continue to rise as technology advances. To combat the issue, the Dodd-Frank Act was implemented in the U.S. in 2010. The act requires companies listed on the stock exchange to report information on possible conflict mineral usage. However, there is a large discrepancy in the compliance levels between many similar technology companies subject to the Dodd-Frank Act. This paper addresses the factors driving compliance through the use of a theory testing method known as pattern matching, and attempts to answer why such similar companies have such different compliance levels. The pattern matching technique looks to test the applicability of theories based on what they theorize will happen and what actually happens in a given scenario. In this instance, the theories know as general deterrence, institutional, and stakeholder theory were put to the test in order to identify the factors driving compliance levels with conflict mineral policies. Both general deterrence and stakeholder theory were able to adequately match their theorized outcomes of conflict mineral compliance with actual observed outcomes. However, general deterrence theory more adequately explained the differences in compliance levels between similar companies. This information has implications on the policy side of the issue, as it reveals a way to more effectively drive up compliance levels by increasing disincentives and penalties in accordance with general deterrence theory.