The landscape of science education is changing. Scientific research and the academy are both becoming increasingly complex, competitive, interdisciplinary, and international. Many federal research agencies, scientific professional societies, and science educators seem to agree on the importance of strong ethics education to help young scientists navigate this increasingly craggy terrain. But, what actually should be done? When it comes to teaching ethics to future scientists, is the apparent current emphasis on basic responsible conduct of research (RCR) sufficient, or should moral theory also be taught in science ethics education? In this thesis I try engage this question by focusing on an existing, related debate on whether moral theory should be part of teaching professional ethics more generally. After delving into the respective approaches promoted by the three primary participants in this debate (C. E. Harris, Bernard Gert, and Michael Davis) I unpack their views in order to ascertain their practical application potential and relative benefits. I then take these findings and apply them to ethics education in science, paying particular attention to its purported learning objectives. In the end I conclude that the presentation of these objectives suggests that moral theory may well be required in order for these objectives of ethics education in science to be fully achieved.

At present, the ideological bias in the human enhancement debate holds that opponents to human enhancement are primarily techno-conservatives who, lacking any reasonable, systematic account of why we ought to be so opposed, simply resort to a sort of fear-mongering and anti-meliorism. This dissertation means to counteract said bias by offering just such an account. Offered herein is a heuristic explanation of how, given a thorough understanding of enhancement both as a technology and as an attitude, we can predict a likely future of rampant commodification and dehumanization of man, and a veritable assault on human flourishing.