Nature-based recreation is a popular way for people to interact with the environment that also confers numerous economic and health benefits. It is important that the social-ecological systems (SES) that host nature-based recreation be managed effectively, both to preserve the benefits of this important human-environment interaction, and to avoid the potential negative outcomes of recreational commons. The SES that host nature-based recreation are characterized by complex and dynamic feedbacks that complicate their management. Managing these systems is made more complex by the suite of external, multi-scalar, and anthropogenic forces (e.g., climate change, trans-boundary pollution) that plague them with increasing frequency. This dissertation investigates the importance of accounting for this full range of system feedbacks when managing for nature-based recreation. I begin with a broad discussion of the types of dilemmas faced by managers of nature-based recreation. I create a systems-thinking typology of management dilemmas that apply across different recreation modes and system contexts, and which are characterized as feedbacks within the broader recreational system. My findings in this chapter have important implications for understanding and anticipating how different exogenous and endogenous shocks (including management interventions, themselves) may work through or change the processes in SES that host nature-based recreation. In the following two chapters, I narrow my focus to examine case studies of specific dilemma archetypes and proposed management interventions. First, I perform an ex ante analysis of a prospective policy response to a regulatory spiral of excess recreational fishing effort and abridged fishing seasons in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico. I estimate behavioral models of fishers’ responses to a prospective incentive-based intervention, and find evidence that such a policy could improve multiple fishery outcomes. Second, I perform an ex post program evaluation of an invasive species bounty program. My results suggest that the program underperformed because it failed to overcome countervailing incentives. Together, my case study analyses reveal the value of modeling for designing policy for these complex SES and show the importance of accounting for the full set of system feedbacks (including the incentives that drive recreator behaviors and the impacts of those behaviors) when managing nature-based recreation.

There is a need in the ecology literature to have a discussion about the fundamental theories from which population dynamics arises. Ad hoc model development is not uncommon in the field often as a result of a need to publish rapidly and frequently. Ecologists and statisticians like Robert J. Steidl and Kenneth P Burnham have called for a more deliberative approach they call "hard thinking". For example, the phenomena of population growth can be captured by almost any sigmoid function. The question of which sigmoid function best explains a data set cannot be answered meaningfully by statistical regression since that can only speak to the validity of the shape. There is a need to revisit enzyme kinetics and ecological stoichiometry to properly justify basal model selection in ecology. This dissertation derives several common population growth models from a generalized equation. The mechanistic validity of these models in different contexts is explored through a kinetic lens. The behavioral kinetic framework is then put to the test by examining a set of biologically plausible growth models against the 1968-1995 elk population count data for northern Yellowstone. Using only this count data, the novel Monod-Holling growth model was able to accurately predict minimum viable population and life expectancy despite both being exogenous to the model and data set. Lastly, the elk/wolf data from Yellowstone was used to compare the validity of the Rosenzweig-MacArthur and Arditi-Ginzburg models. They both were derived from a more general model which included both predator and prey mediated steps. The Arditi-Ginzburg model was able to fit the training data better, but only the Rosenzweig-MacArthur model matched the validation data. Accounting for animal sexual behavior allowed for the creation of the Monod-Holling model which is just as simple as the logistic differential equation but provides greater insights for conservation purposes. Explicitly acknowledging the ethology of wolf predation helps explain the differences in predictive performances by the best fit Rosenzweig-MacArthur and Arditi-Ginzburg models. The behavioral kinetic framework has proven to be a useful tool, and it has the ability to provide even further insights going forward.

My research is motivated by a rule of thumb that no matter how well a system is designed, some actors fail to fulfill the behavior which is needed to sustain the system. Examples of misbehavior are shirking, rule infraction, and free riding. With a focus on social-ecological systems, this thesis explored the effectiveness of social feedback mechanisms driven by the two available individual options: the exit option is defined as any response to escape from an objectionable state of affairs; and the voice option as any attempt to stay put and improve the state. Using a stylized dynamic model, the first study investigates how the coexistence of participatory and groundwater market institutions affects government-managed irrigation systems. My findings suggest that patterns of bureaucratic reactions to exit (using private tubewells) and voice (putting pressure on irrigation bureaus) are critical to shaping system dynamics. I also found that the silence option – neither exit nor voice – can impede a further improvement in public infrastructure, but in some cases, can improve public infrastructure dramatically. Using a qualitative comparative analysis of 30 self-governing fishing groups in South Korea, the second study examines how resource mobility, group size, and Ostrom’s Design Principles for rule enforcement can co-determine the effectiveness of the voice option in self-controlling rule infractions. Results suggest that the informal mechanism for conflict resolution is a necessary condition for successful self-governance of local fisheries and that even if rules for monitoring and graduated sanctions are not in use, groups can be successful when they harvest only stationary resources. Using an agent-based model of public good provision, the third study explores under what socioeconomic conditions the exit option – neither producing nor consuming collective benefits – can work effectively to enhance levels of cooperation. The model results suggest that the exit option contributes to the spread of cooperators in mid- and large-size groups at the moderate level of exit payoff, given that group interaction occurs to increase the number of cooperators.

In many social-ecological systems, shared resources play a critical role in supporting the livelihoods of rural populations. Physical infrastructure enables resource access and reduces the variability of resource supply. In order for the infrastructure to remain functional, institutions must incentivize individuals to engage in provision and maintenance. The objective of my dissertation is to understand key formal and informal institutions that affect provision of shared infrastructure and the policy tools that may improve infrastructure provision. I examine these questions in the context of irrigation systems in India because infrastructure maintenance is a persistent challenge and system function is critical for global food production.

My first study investigates how the presence of private infrastructure, such as groundwater pumps, affects the provision of shared infrastructure, such as shared tanks or surface reservoirs. I examine whether formal institutions, such as water pricing instruments, may prevent under-provision of the shared tanks. My findings suggest that in the absence of rules that coordinate tank maintenance, the presence of private pumps will have a detrimental effect on system productivity and equality. On the other hand, the combination of a fixed groundwater fee and a location-based maintenance fee for tank users can improve system productivity and equality.

The second study examines the effect of power asymmetries between farmers, caused by informal institutions such as caste, on the persistence of political institutions that govern infrastructure provision. I examined the effect of policy tools, such as non-farm wage employment and informational interventions, on the persistence of two types of political institutions: self-governed and nested. Results suggest that critical regime shifts in political institutions can be generated by either intervening in formal institutions, such as non-farm wage employment, or informal institutions, such as knowledge transmission or learning mechanisms.

The third study investigates how bureaucratic and political corruption affect public good provision. I examine how institutional and environmental factors affect the likelihood of corruption and infrastructure provision. I demonstrate that cracking down on corruption is only beneficial when infrastructure provision is poor. I also show that bureaucratic wages play an important role in curbing extralegal transactions and improving infrastructure provision.

Population growth, social interaction, and environmental variability are interrelated facets of the same complex system. Tracing the flow of food, water, information, and energy within these social-ecological systems is essential for understanding their long-term behavior. Leveraging an archaeological perspective of how past societies coevolved with their natural environments will be critical to anticipating the impact of impending climate change on farming communities in the developing world. However, there is currently a lack of formal, quantitative theory rooted in first principles of human behavior that can predict the empirical regularities of the archaeological record in semiarid regions. Through a series of models -- statistical, computational, and mathematical -- and empirical data from two long-term archaeological case studies in the pre-Hispanic American Southwest and Roman North Africa, I explore the feedbacks between population growth and social interaction in water-limited agrarian societies. First, I use a statistical model to analyze a database of 7.5 million artifacts collected from nearly 500 archaeological sites in the Southwest and found that sites located in different climatic zones were more likely to interact with one another than a sites occupying the same zone. Next, I develop a computational model of demography and food production in ancient agrarian societies and, using North Africa as a motivating example, show how the concrete actions and interactions of millions of individual people lead to emergent patterns of population growth and stability. Finally, I build a simple mathematical model of trade and migration among agricultural settlements to determine how the relative costs and benefits of social interaction drive population growth and shape long-term settlement patterns. Together, these studies form the foundation for a unified quantitative approach to regional social-ecological systems. By combining theory and methods from ecology, geography, and climate science, archaeologists can better leverage insights from diverse times and places to fill critical knowledge gaps in the study of food security and sustainability in the drylands of today.

Design is a fundamental human activity through which we attempt to navigate and manipulate the world around us for our survival, pleasure, and benefit. As human society has evolved, so too has the complexity and impact of our design activities on the environment. Now clearly intertwined as a complex social-ecological system at the global scale, we struggle in our ability to understand, design, implement, and manage solutions to complex global issues such as climate change, water scarcity, food security, and natural disasters. Some have asserted that this is because complex adaptive systems, like these, are moving targets that are only partially designed and partially emergent and self-organizing. Furthermore, these types of systems are difficult to understand and control due to the inherent dynamics of "wicked problems", such as: uncertainty, social dilemmas, inequities, and trade-offs involving multiple feedback loops that sometimes cause both the problems and their potential solutions to shift and evolve together. These problems do not, however, negate our collective need to effectively design, produce, and implement strategies that allow us to appropriate, distribute, manage and sustain the resources on which we depend. Design, however, is not well understood in the context of complex adaptive systems involving common-pool resources. In addition, the relationship between our attempts at control and performance at the system-level over time is not well understood either. This research contributes to our understanding of design in common-pool resource systems by using a multi-methods approach to investigate longitudinal data on an innovative participatory design intervention implemented in nineteen small-scale, farmer-managed irrigation systems in the Indrawati River Basin of Nepal over the last three decades. The intervention was intended as an experiment in using participatory planning, design and construction processes to increase food security and strengthen the self-sufficiency and self-governing capacity of resource user groups within the poorest district in Nepal. This work is the first time that theories of participatory design-processes have been empirically tested against longitudinal data on a number of small-scale, locally managed common-pool resource systems. It clarifies and helps to develop a theory of design in this setting for both scientific and practical purposes.

Sustainability depends in part on our capacity to resolve dilemmas of the commons in Coupled Infrastructure Systems (CIS). Thus, we need to know more about how to incentivize individuals to take collective action to manage shared resources. Moreover, given that we will experience new and more extreme weather events due to climate change, we need to learn how to increase the robustness of CIS to those shocks. This dissertation studies irrigation systems to contribute to the development of an empirically based theory of commons governance for robust systems. I first studied the eight institutional design principles (DPs) for long enduring systems of shared resources that the Nobel Prize winner Elinor Ostrom proposed in 1990. I performed a critical literature review of 64 studies that looked at the institutional configuration of CIS, and based on my findings I propose some modifications of their definitions and application in research and policy making. I then studied how the revisited design principles, when analyzed conjointly with biophysical and ethnographic characteristics of CISs, perform to avoid over-appropriation, poverty and critical conflicts among users of an irrigation system. After carrying out a meta-analysis of 28 cases around the world, I found that particular combinations of those variables related to population size, countries corruption, the condition of water storage, monitoring of users behavior, and involving users in the decision making process for the commons governance, were sufficient to obtain the desired outcomes. The two last studies were based on the Peruvian Piura Basin, a CIS that has been exposed to environmental shocks for decades. I used secondary and primary data to carry out a longitudinal study using as guidance the robustness framework, and different hypothesis from prominent collapse theories to draw potential explanations. I then developed a dynamic model that shows how at the current situation it is more effective to invest in rules enforcement than in the improvement of the physical infrastructure (e.g. reservoir). Finally, I explored different strategies to increase the robustness of the system, through enabling collective action in the Basin.

Anderies (2015); Anderies et al. (2016), informed by Ostrom (2005), aim to employ robust

feedback control models of social-ecological systems (SESs), to inform policy and the

design of institutions guiding resilient resource use. Cote and Nightingale (2012) note that

the main assumptions of resilience research downplay culture and social power. Addressing

the epistemic gap between positivism and interpretation (Rosenberg 2016), this dissertation

argues that power and culture indeed are of primary interest in SES research.

Human use of symbols is seen as an evolved semiotic capacity. First, representation is

argued to arise as matter achieves semiotic closure (Pattee 1969; Rocha 2001) at the onset

of natural selection. Guided by models by Kauffman (1993), the evolution of a symbolic

code in genes is examined, and thereon the origin of representations other than genetic

in evolutionary transitions (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 1995; Beach 2003). Human

symbolic interaction is proposed as one that can support its own evolutionary dynamics.

The model offered for wider dynamics in society are “flywheels,” mutually reinforcing

networks of relations. They arise as interactions in a domain of social activity intensify, e.g.

due to interplay of infrastructures, mediating built, social, and ecological affordances (An-

deries et al. 2016). Flywheels manifest as entities facilitated by the simplified interactions

(e.g. organizations) and as cycles maintaining the infrastructures (e.g. supply chains). They

manifest internal specialization as well as distributed intention, and so can favor certain

groups’ interests, and reinforce cultural blind spots to social exclusion (Mills 2007).

The perspective is applied to research of resilience in SESs, considering flywheels a

semiotic extension of feedback control. Closer attention to representations of potentially

excluded groups is justified on epistemic in addition to ethical grounds, as patterns in cul-

tural text and social relations reflect the functioning of wider social processes. Participatory

methods are suggested to aid in building capacity for institutional learning.

This dissertation will look at large scale collaboration through the lens of online communities to answer questions about what makes a collaboration persist. Results address how collaborations attract contributions, behaviors that could give rise to patterns seen in the data, and the properties of collaborations that drive those behaviors.

It is understood that collaborations, online and otherwise, must retain users to remain productive. However, before users can be retained they must be recruited. In the first project, a few necessary properties of the ``attraction'' function are identified by constraining the dynamics of an ODE (Ordinary Differential Equation) model. Additionally, more than 100 communities of the Stack Exchange networks are parameterized and their distributions reported.

Collaborations do not exist in a vacuum, they compete with and share users with other collaborations. To address this, the second project focuses on an agent-based model (ABM) of a community of online collaborations using a mechanistic approach. The ABM is compared to data obtained from the Stack Exchange network and produces similar distributional patterns.

The third project is a thorough sensitivity analysis of the model created in the second project. A variance based sensitivity analysis is performed to evaluate the relative importance of 21 parameters of the model. Results indicate that population parameters impact many outcome metrics, though even those parameters that tend towards a low impact can be crucial for some outcomes.