Abstract Upon review of complex ethnic conflict over the past century in the Great Lakes region, the 2005 Opinion of the Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo does not properly acknowledge the conflict's complexity, and thus fails in applying customary international law to the allegations under dispute. Both concepts of self-defense and the violation of the duty of vigilance are found particularly restrictive, and their application by the ICJ does not recognize realities. The thesis is laid out to provide context for the dispute, followed by consideration of the historical circumstances that shaped the ethnic, political, and economic reality of the Second Congo War. Finally the paper will begin an inquiry into self-defense and the duty of vigilance as unequipped legal concepts to consider the atypical conflict. I. Introduction II. The Dispute: The Second Congo War III. Overview of Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo IV. Lack of Recognition for Historical Background V. Contentious Handlings of Concepts of International Law a. Self-Defense: Questionable Criteria b. Breaches of International Obligations: Duty of Vigilance in Armed Activities VI. Conclusion

In this discussion I will state fundamental principles of Kelsen's Legal Positivism in International Law and explain four problems with his theory. I will then propose two suggestions in the light of which Kelsen's theory is modified in this discussion and explain how these two suggestions address the four problems and help the theory account for regime change. Finally, I will address possible objections to the view advanced in this discussion.