This paper examines the qualitative and quantitative effects of the 2008 financial crisis on the current landscape of the investment banking industry. We begin by reviewing what occurred during the financial crisis, including which banks took TARP money, which banks became bank holding companies, and significant mergers and acquisitions. We then examine the new regulations that were created in reaction to the crisis, including the Dodd-Frank Act. In particular, we focus on the Volcker Rule, which is a section of the act that prohibits proprietary trading and other risky activities at banks. Then we shift into a quantitative analysis of the changes that banks made from the years 2005-2016. To do this, we chose four banks to be representative of the industry: Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, J.P. Morgan, and Bank of America. We then analyze four metrics for each bank: revenue mix, value at risk, tangible common equity ratio, and debt to equity ratio. These provide methods for analyzing how banks have shifted their revenue centers to accommodate new regulations, as well as how these shifts have affected banks' risk levels and leverage. Our data show that all four banks that we observed shifted their revenue centers to flatter revenue areas, such as investment management, wealth management, and consumer banking operations. This was paired with fairly flat investment banking revenues across the board when controlling for overall market changes in the investment banking sector. Additionally, trading-focused banks significantly shifted their operations away from proprietary trading and higher risk activities. These changes resulted in lower value at risk measures for Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley with very minor increases for J.P. Morgan and Bank of America, although these two banks had low levels of absolute value at risk when compared to Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. All banks' tangible common equity ratios increased and debt to equity ratios decreased, indicating a safer investment for shareholders and lower leverage. We conclude by offering a forecast of our expectations for the future, particularly in light of a Trump presidency. We expect less regulation going forward and the potential reversal of the Volcker Rule. We believe that these changes would result in more revenue coming from trading and riskier strategies, increasing value at risk, decreasing tangible common equity ratios, and increasing debt to equity ratios. While we do expect less regulation and higher risk, we do not expect these banks to reach pre-crisis levels due to the significant amount of regulations that would be particularly difficult for the Trump administration to reverse.