In this paper, a novel model of Hotelling duopoly is introduced that explains horizontal product variety as the result of consumer preferences, expanding on and meshing the works of Hotelling (1929) and Neven (1985). From this model, two opposing forces from consumer preferences are found that impact the variety and price decisions of firms: market share revenues and price revenues. As firms face consumers with highly linear (weak) preferences over variety, the profit incentive is to simply capture the market by offering products that appeal to the middle consumer. However, as firms face consumers with highly quadratic (strong) preferences over variety, the profit incentive is to carve out and exploit a market segment by offering a distinct variety. Thus, observed product variety between minimal and maximal differentiation is emergent from consumer preferences, as firms face a balance of price and market share incentives.

The field of behavioral economics explores the ways in which individuals make choices under uncertainty, in part, by examining the role that risk attitudes play in a person’s efforts to maximize their own utility. This thesis aims to contribute to the body of economic literature regarding risk attitudes by first evaluating the traditional economic method for discerning risk coefficients by examining whether students provide reasonable answers to lottery questions. Second, the answers of reasonable respondents are subject to our economic model using the CRRA utility function in which Python code is used to make predictions of the risk coefficients of respondents via a two-step regression procedure. Lastly, the degree to which the economic model provides a good fit for the lottery answers given by reasonable respondents is discerned. The most notable findings of the study are as follows. College students had extreme difficulty in understanding lottery questions of this sort, with Medical and Life Science majors struggling significantly more than both Business and Engineering majors. Additionally, gender was correlated with estimated risk coefficients, with females being more risk-loving relative to males. Lastly, in regards to the model’s goodness of fit when evaluating potential losses, the expected utility model involving choice under uncertainty was consistent with the behavior of progressives and moderates but inconsistent with the behavior of conservatives.

We develop a unique model for household preferences in a three good market of television content (cable), internet content (Netflix), and income spent on any other good or activity. Utility is a function of the time spent viewing television content, time spent viewing internet content, and income spent otherwise. Preferences are determined by the complementarity (or substitutability) of television and internet content, the complementarity of viewing content and spending income otherwise, and individual preference for income. Consumers maximize utility subject to time of viewership and budget constraints. We analyze the comparative statics of the model by varying the complementarity between television and internet content and the complementarity between viewing content and spending income otherwise. We develop a model of firms, in which there are two firms offering one product each who compete on price. They charge a flat-fee for their product (either television or internet content) and have a fixed cost. Their revenue is determined by the number of consumers who choose to purchase their product multiplied by the price they charge. We find a collusive outcome for the firms. We analyze the Nash Equilibrium of the model. We only found symmetric Mixed Action Nash Equilibria (MANE), with the following interesting feature: Bertrand Competition causes firms to choose low prices very often, but firms price significantly higher should the price drop too low. Thus, the MANE places high probability mass on the lowest and highest prices of each firm but has little mass elsewhere.

Are there measurable differences between the human capital of the refugee children born inside and outside of the United States? If so, does the amount of time spent abroad before immigrating matter, and can we get an idea of what happens to this gap over time? Looking at the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS) 1991-2006, I examine standardized test scores and other indicators of performance of young Indochinese refugees and immigrants. This study finds evidence for a negative correlation between being born abroad and performance in selected metrics at the time of early adolescence. This is extended into a negative relationship between the lengths of time abroad before coming to the United States (age of arrival) and those same metrics. However, this study finds signs that this gap in human capital is at least partly bridged by the time of early adulthood. It remains unclear though, whether this possible catch up is reflected in other early adult outcomes such as household income.

This paper examines the behavior of international lending networks a currency crisis, specifically focusing on connectivity as a differentiating factor between financial networks. The model consists of economies that borrow and lend capital in nominal units of the creditor's currency. A shock then leads to the depreciation of the currency of a single economy which causes exchange rate fluctuations throughout the financial network. This alters the nominal value of debts that economies are required to repay, potentially putting them at risk of default. The results show that the architecture of a financial network is an important factor in minimizing the number of defaults and maximizing total social welfare. An increase in connectivity among economies leads to both greater stability and greater total social welfare of a network, since diversification of liabilities decreases fluctuations in exchange rates.

This paper develops a theoretical price competition model, based on the model established in Brekke et al. (2010), in order to analyze the effects of exogenous reference price regulations on pharmaceutical firms' pricing strategies and competitive decisions. Our model establishes demand schedules that represent consumer demand for generic, brand-name, and on-patent drugs under free competition and governmental regulation. Drug equilibrium prices are determined by having firms play a Bertrand game. Equilibrium prices under reference price regulation indicate that the reference price set by regulators affects the price decisions of firms. Our model concludes that a higher reference price will increase the price of both the on-patent pioneer drug as well as the brand-name drug, while the generic drug price equilibrium is not affected by the reference price.