This dissertation examines six different models in the field of econophysics using interacting particle systems as the basis of exploration. In each model examined, the underlying structure is a graph G = (V , E ), where each x ∈ V represents an individual who is characterized by the number of coins in her possession at time t. At each time step t, an edge (x, y) ∈ E is chosen at random, resulting in an exchange of coins between individuals x and y according to the rules of the model. Random variables ξt, and ξt(x) keep track of the current configuration and number of coins individual x has at time t respectively. Of particular interest is the distribution of coins in the long run. Considered first are the uniform reshuffling model, immediate exchange model and model with saving propensity. For each of these models, the number of coins an individual can have is nonnegative and the total number of coins in the system is conserved for all time. It is shown here that the distribution of coins converges to the exponential distribution, gamma distribution and a pseudo gamma distribution respectively. The next two models introduce debt, however, the total number of coins again remains fixed. It is shown here that when there is an individual debt limit, the number of coins per individual converges to a shifted exponential distribution. Alternatively, when a collective debt limit is imposed on the whole population, a heuristic argument is given supporting the conjecture that the distribution of coins converges to an asymmetric Laplace distribution. The final model considered focuses on the effect of cooperation on a population. Unlike the previous models discussed here, the total number of coins in the system at any given time is not bounded and the process evolves in continuous time rather than in discrete time. For this model, death of an individual will occur if they run out of coins. It is shown here that the survival probability for the population is impacted by the level of cooperation along with how productive the population is as whole.

In baseball, a starting pitcher has historically been a more durable pitcher capable of lasting long into games without tiring. For the entire history of Major League Baseball, these pitchers have been expected to last 6 innings or more into a game before being replaced. However, with the advances in statistics and sabermetrics and their gradual acceptance by professional coaches, the role of the starting pitcher is beginning to change. Teams are experimenting with having starters being replaced quicker, challenging the traditional role of the starting pitcher. The goal of this study is to determine if there is an exact point at which a team would benefit from replacing a starting or relief pitcher with another pitcher using statistical analyses. We will use logistic stepwise regression to predict the likelihood of a team scoring a run if a substitution is made or not made given the current game situation.

There are multiple mathematical models for alignment of individuals moving within a group. In a first class of models, individuals tend to relax their velocity toward the average velocity of other nearby neighbors. These types of models are motivated by the flocking behavior exhibited by birds. Another class of models have been introduced to describe rapid changes of individual velocity, referred to as jump, which better describes behavior of smaller agents (e.g. locusts, ants). In the second class of model, individuals will randomly choose to align with another nearby individual, matching velocities. There are several open questions concerning these two type of behavior: which behavior is the most efficient to create a flock (i.e. to converge toward the same velocity)? Will flocking still emerge when the number of individuals approach infinity? Analysis of these models show that, in the homogeneous case where all individuals are capable of interacting with each other, the variance of the velocities in both the jump model and the relaxation model decays to 0 exponentially for any nonzero number of individuals. This implies the individuals in the system converge to an absorbing state where all individuals share the same velocity, therefore individuals converge to a flock even as the number of individuals approach infinity. Further analysis focused on the case where interactions between individuals were determined by an adjacency matrix. The second eigenvalues of the Laplacian of this adjacency matrix (denoted ƛ2) provided a lower bound on the rate of decay of the variance. When ƛ2 is nonzero, the system is said to converge to a flock almost surely. Furthermore, when the adjacency matrix is generated by a random graph, such that connections between individuals are formed with probability p (where 0

1/N. ƛ2 is a good estimator of the rate of convergence of the system, in comparison to the value of p used to generate the adjacency matrix..

Division of Labor among social insects is frequently discussed in regards to the colony's worker population. However, before a colony achieves a worker population, a queen is required to perform all of the tasks necessary for her survival: foraging, building the colony, and brood care. A simple ODE model was developed through the use of a framework of replicator equations in dynamical environments to investigate how queen ants perform and distribute all of the tasks necessary for her and her colony's survival by incorporating individual internal thresholds and environmental stimulus. Modi�cations to the internal threshold, risk of performing the task, and the rate of increase of the environmental stimulus were also explored. Because of the simplicity of the model, it could also be used to measure the task performance of larger populations of social insects. However, the model has only been applied to the data collected from Pogonomyrmex barbatus single queen ants.

We study two models of a competitive game in which players continuously receive points and wager them in one-on-one battles. In each model the loser of a battle has their points reset, while the points the winner receives is what sets the two models apart. In the knockout model the winner receives no new points, while in the winner-takes-all model the points that the loser had are added to the winner's total. Recurrence properties are assessed for both models: the knockout model is recurrent except for the all-zero state, and the winner-takes-all model is transient, but retains some aspect of recurrence. In addition, we study the population-level allocation of points; for the winner-takes-all model we show explicitly that the proportion of individuals having any number j of points, j=0,1,... approaches a stationary distribution that can be computed recursively. Graphs of numerical simulations are included to exemplify the results proved.

The Axelrod Model is an agent-based adaptive model. The Axelrod Model shows the eects of a mechanism of convergent social inuence. Do local conver- gences generate global polarization ? Will it be possible for all dierences between individuals in a population comprised of neighbors to disappear ? There are many mechanisms to approach this issue ; the Axelrod Model is one of them.

Serge Galams voting systems and public debate models are used to model voting behaviors of two competing opinions in democratic societies. Galam assumes that individuals in the population are independently in favor of one opinion with a fixed probability p, making the initial number of that type of opinion a binomial random variable. This analysis revisits Galams models from the point of view of the hypergeometric random variable by assuming the initial number of individuals in favor of an opinion is a fixed deterministic number. This assumption is more realistic, especially when analyzing small populations. Evolution of the models is based on majority rules, with a bias introduced when there is a tie. For the hier- archical voting system model, in order to derive the probability that opinion +1 would win, the analysis was done by reversing time and assuming that an individual in favor of opinion +1 wins. Then, working backwards we counted the number of configurations at the next lowest level that could induce each possible configuration at the level above, and continued this process until reaching the bottom level, i.e., the initial population. Using this method, we were able to derive an explicit formula for the probability that an individual in favor of opinion +1 wins given any initial count of that opinion, for any group size greater than or equal to three. For the public debate model, we counted the total number of individuals in favor of opinion +1 at each time step and used this variable to define a random walk. Then, we used first-step analysis to derive an explicit formula for the probability that an individual in favor of opinion +1 wins given any initial count of that opinion for group sizes of three. The spatial public debate model evolves based on the proportional rule. For the spatial model, the most natural graphical representation to construct the process results in a model that is not mathematically tractable. Thus, we defined a different graphical representation that is mathematically equivalent to the first graphical representation, but in this model it is possible to define a dual process that is mathematically tractable. Using this graphical representation we prove clustering in 1D and 2D and coexistence in higher dimensions following the same approach as for the voter model interacting particle system.

This thesis explores and explains a stochastic model in Evolutionary Game Theory introduced by Dr. Nicolas Lanchier. The model is a continuous-time Markov chain that maps the two-dimensional lattice into the strategy space {1,2}. At every vertex in the grid there is exactly one player whose payoff is determined by its strategy and the strategies of its neighbors. Update times are exponential random variables with parameters equal to the absolute value of the respective cells' payoffs. The model is connected to an ordinary differential equation known as the replicator equation. This differential equation is analyzed to find its fixed points and stability. Then, by simulating the model using Java code and observing the change in dynamics which result from varying the parameters of the payoff matrix, the stochastic model's phase diagram is compared to the replicator equation's phase diagram to see what effect local interactions and stochastic update times have on the evolutionary stability of strategies. It is revealed that in the stochastic model altruistic strategies can be evolutionarily stable, and selfish strategies are only evolutionarily stable if they are more selfish than their opposing strategy. This contrasts with the replicator equation where selfishness is always evolutionarily stable and altruism never is.

This paper uses network theory to simulate Nash equilibria for selfish travel within a traffic network. Specifically, it examines the phenomenon of Braess's Paradox, the counterintuitive occurrence in which adding capacity to a traffic network increases the social costs paid by travelers in a new Nash equilibrium. It also employs the measure of the price of anarchy, a ratio between the social cost of the Nash equilibrium flow through a network and the socially optimal cost of travel. These concepts are the basis of the theory behind undesirable selfish routing to identify problematic links and roads in existing metropolitan traffic networks (Youn et al., 2008), suggesting applicative potential behind the theoretical questions this paper attempts to answer. New topologies of networks which generate Braess's Paradox are found. In addition, the relationship between the number of nodes in a network and the number of occurrences of Braess's Paradox, and the relationship between the number of nodes in a network and a network's price of anarchy distribution are studied.

We model communication among social insects as an interacting particle system in which individuals perform one of two tasks and neighboring sites anti-mimic one another. Parameters of our model are a probability of defection 2 (0; 1) and relative cost ci > 0 to the individual performing task i. We examine this process on complete graphs, bipartite graphs, and the integers, answering questions about the relationship between communication, defection rates and the division of labor. Assuming the division of labor is ideal when exactly half of the colony is performing each task, we nd that on some bipartite graphs and the integers it can eventually be made arbitrarily close to optimal if defection rates are sufficiently small. On complete graphs the fraction of individuals performing each task is also closest to one half when there is no defection, but is bounded by a constant dependent on the relative costs of each task.