A mathematical approach was developed to evaluate the resilience of coupled power-water networks using a variant of contingency analysis adapted from electric transmission studies. In particular, the “what if” scenarios explored in power systems research were extended and applied for coupled power-water network research by evaluating how stressors and failures in the water network can propagate across system boundaries and into the electric network. Reduction in power system contingency reserves was the metric for determining violation of N-1 contingency reliability. Geospatial considerations were included using high-resolution, publicly available Geographic Information System data on infrastructure in the Phoenix Metropolitan Area that was used to generate a power network with 599 transmission lines and total generation capacity of 18.98 GW and a water network with 2,624 water network lines and capacity to serve up to 1.72M GPM of surface water. The steady-state model incorporated operating requirements for the power network—e.g., contingency reserves—and the water network—e.g., pressure ranges—while seeking to meet electric load and water demand. Interconnections developed between the infrastructures demonstrated how alternations to the system state and/or configuration of one network affect the other network, with results demonstrated through co-simulation of the power network and water network using OpenDSS and EPANET, respectively. Results indicate four key findings that help operators understand the interdependent behavior of the coupled power-water network: (i) two water failure scenarios (water flowing out of Waddell dam and CAP canal flowing west of Waddell dam) are critical to power-water network N-1 contingency reliability above 60% power system loading and at 100% water system demand, (ii) fast-starting natural gas generating units are necessary to maintain N-1 contingency reliability below 60% power system loading, (iii) Coolidge Station was the power plant to most frequently undergo a reduction in reserves amongst the water failure scenarios that cause a violation of N-1 reliability, (iv) power network vulnerability to water network failures was non-linear because it depends on the generating units that are dispatched, which can vary as line thermal limits or unit generation capacities are reached.