This dissertation seeks to show that the fate of emerging democracies is largely dependent upon the strategic behaviors of political militaries and their coup potential. Given the known issue of democratization's temporarily destabilizing effects, it first examines if such effects makes states vulnerable to coups. It finds clear evidence on democratization's destabilizing effects on coup risk. Such evidence is used to shed new light on the literature about the armed forces and coups in emerging democracies. To explain variation in the military's responses to democratization and consolidation against coup threats, it argues that how the armed forces were organized and controlled during the authoritarian periods influences whether emerging democracies are able to consolidate against coup risk. Second, it explores the declining coup risk and the trilateral relationship between Western democracy promotion, coup risk, and election violence in recently emerging electoral regimes, the so-called "illiberal democracies." It argues that vulnerability to Western leverage, coupled with an emphasis on multiparty elections, creates a political moral hazard problem for incumbents, permitting them to commit electoral violence during the emergence of mass electoral politics.