Rapid technology scaling, the main driver of the power and performance improvements of computing solutions, has also rendered our computing systems extremely susceptible to transient errors called soft errors. Among the arsenal of techniques to protect computation from soft errors, Control Flow Checking (CFC) based techniques have gained a reputation of effective, yet low-cost protection mechanism. The basic idea is that, there is a high probability that a soft-fault in program execution will eventually alter the control flow of the program. Therefore just by making sure that the control flow of the program is correct, significant protection can be achieved. More than a dozen techniques for CFC have been developed over the last several decades, ranging from hardware techniques, software techniques, and hardware-software hybrid techniques as well. Our analysis shows that existing CFC techniques are not only ineffective in protecting from soft errors, but cause additional power and performance overheads. For this analysis, we develop and validate a simulation based experimental setup to accurately and quantitatively estimate the architectural vulnerability of a program execution on a processor micro-architecture. We model the protection achieved by various state-of-the-art CFC techniques in this quantitative vulnerability estimation setup, and find out that software only CFC protection schemes (CFCSS, CFCSS+NA, CEDA) increase system vulnerability by 18% to 21% with 17% to 38% performance overhead. Hybrid CFC protection (CFEDC) increases vulnerability by 5%, while the vulnerability remains almost the same for hardware only CFC protection (CFCET); notwithstanding the hardware overheads of design cost, area, and power incurred in the hardware modifications required for their implementations.