The presence of strategic agents can pose unique challenges to data collection and distributed learning. This dissertation first explores the social network dimension of data collection markets, and then focuses on how the strategic agents can be efficiently and effectively incentivized to cooperate in distributed machine learning frameworks. The first problem explores the impact of social learning in collecting and trading unverifiable information where a data collector purchases data from users through a payment mechanism. Each user starts with a personal signal which represents the knowledge about the underlying state the data collector desires to learn. Through social interactions, each user also acquires additional information from his neighbors in the social network. It is revealed that both the data collector and the users can benefit from social learning which drives down the privacy costs and helps to improve the state estimation for a given total payment budget. In the second half, a federated learning scheme to train a global learning model with strategic agents, who are not bound to contribute their resources unconditionally, is considered. Since the agents are not obliged to provide their true stochastic gradient updates and the server is not capable of directly validating the authenticity of reported updates, the learning process may reach a noncooperative equilibrium. First, the actions of the agents are assumed to be binary: cooperative or defective. If the cooperative action is taken, the agent sends a privacy-preserved version of stochastic gradient signal. If the defective action is taken, the agent sends an arbitrary uninformative noise signal. Furthermore, this setup is extended into the scenarios with more general actions spaces where the quality of the stochastic gradient updates have a range of discrete levels. The proposed methodology evaluates each agent's stochastic gradient according to a reference gradient estimate which is constructed from the gradients provided by other agents, and rewards the agent based on that evaluation.