The welfare consequences of price versus quantity-based regulation are known to differ when information about marginal benefits or costs of abatement is imperfect. Does uncertainty about demand for the polluting good also matter for welfare of these two approaches to regulation? In chapter 1, I use plant-level survey data and high frequency variation in power consumption to assess the dynamic implications of uncertainty about future demand for the relative welfare consequences of carbon taxes and cap-and-trade regulation. I address this question in the context of the electricity sector where demand risk is particularly salient. I show that the choice between policy instruments depends on how firms and consumers balance unpredictable output volatility (higher with carbon taxes) vs. price volatility (higher with cap-and-trade regulation). Over a wide range of policy-relevant abatement targets, I find carbon taxes outperform cap-and-trade in terms of welfare. Financial incentives like the Production Tax Credit are central initiatives behind wind power as the leading renewable energy source in the U.S. But do institutional design features of energy markets matter for cost-effectiveness of subsidies to wind investments? In chapter 2, I answer this question by investigating how the design of procurement contracts that are typically used by wind developers affects their investment incentives. Using unit-level data from wind farm production and installed capacity, I find that structuring subsidies based on key features of the type of procurement contracts associated to wind projects leads to major reductions in public expenditures in terms of subsidy payments to wind developers without undermining their investment incentives. The U.S. federal government is known to have a history of heavily subsidizing the wind power industry. Subsidies either to output (Production Tax Credit) or investment goods (Investment Tax Credit) have been critical to replace emissions-intensive technologies with wind power. Which type of subsidy is best to incentivize wind investments at the least cost? In chapter 3, I use plant-level data of wind facilities from the Texas electricity market to develop and estimate a model of investment decisions that accounts for productivity shocks at the wind farm level and prudent behavior of developers. I find that subsidizing production can increase average yearly investment rates in wind capacity up to 2.5 percentage points over mean investment rates under alternative subsidies to capital. This is driven by precautionary savings that developers accumulate to smooth out potential future shocks to investment income when adverse weather conditions lead to low subsidy payments.