In order to meet the world’s growing energy need, it is necessary to create a reliable, robust, and resilient electric power grid. One way to ensure the creation of such a grid is through the extensive use of synchrophasor technology that is based on devices called phasor measurement units (PMUs), and their derivatives, such as μPMUs. Global positioning system (GPS) time-synchronized wide-area monitoring, protection, and control enabled by PMUs has opened up new ways in which the power grid can tackle the problems it faces today. However, with implementation of new technologies comes new challenges, and one of those challenges when it comes to PMUs is the misuse of GPS as a method to obtain a time reference.The use of GPS in PMUs is very intuitive as it is a convenient method to time stamp electrical signals, which in turn helps provide an accurate snapshot of the performance of the PMU-monitored section of the grid. However, GPS is susceptible to different types of signal interruptions due to natural (such as weather) or unnatural (jamming, spoofing) causes. The focus of this thesis is on demonstrating the practical feasibility of GPS spoofing attacks on PMUs, as well as developing novel countermeasures for them. Prior research has demonstrated that GPS spoofing attacks on PMUs can cripple power system operation. The research conducted here first provides an experimental evidence of the feasibility of such an attack using commonly available digital radios known as software defined radio (SDR). Next, it introduces a new countermeasure against such attacks using GPS signal redundancy and low power long range (LoRa) spread spectrum modulation technique. The proposed approach checks the integrity of the GPS signal at remote locations and compares the data with the PMU’s current output. This countermeasure is a steppingstone towards developing a ready-to-deploy system that can provide an instant solution to the GPS spoofing detection problem for PMUs already placed in the power grid.