Astrobiology is premised on the idea that life beyond Earth can exist. Yet, everything known about life is derivative from life on Earth. To understand life beyond Earth, then, requires a definition of life that is abstracted beyond a particular geophysical context. To do this requires a formal understanding of the physical mechanisms by which matter is animated into life. At current, such descriptions are completely lacking for the emergence of life, but do exist for the emergence of consciousness. Namely, contemporary neuroscience offers definitions for universal physical processes that are in one-to-one correspondence with conscious experience. Since consciousness is a sufficient condition for life, these universal definitions of consciousness offer an interesting way forward in terms of the search for life in the cosmos. In this work, I systematically examine Integrated Information Theory (IIT), a well-established theory of consciousness, with the aim of applying it in both biological and astrobiological settings. Surprisingly, I discover major problems with Integrated Information Theory on two fronts: mathematical and epistemological. On the mathematical side, I show how degeneracies buried deep within the theory render it mathematically ill-defined, while on the epistemological side, I prove that the postulates of IIT are scientifically unfalsifiable and inherently metaphysical. Given that IIT is the preeminent theory of consciousness in modern neuroscience, these results have far-reaching implications in this field. In addition, I show that the epistemic issues of falsifiability that hamstring IIT apply quite generally to all contemporary theories of consciousness, which suggests a major reframing of the problem is necessary. The problems that I reveal in regard to defining consciousness offer an important parallel in regard to defining life, as both fields seek to define their topic of study in absence of an existing theoretical framework. To avoid metaphysical problems related to falsifiability, universal theories of both life and consciousness must be framed with respect to independent empirical observations that can be used to benchmark predictions from the theory. In this regard, I argue that the epistemic debate over scientific theories of consciousness should be used to inform the discussion regarding theoretical definitions of life.