Shareholder Activism is a mechanism by which investors who hold a significant but

non-majority percentage of a company’s stock, exercise their voting rights, participate in

corporate governance and influence operational decisions of target companies. The

purpose is improve corporate governance, increase firm performance and boost share

-holders’ returns. Existing studies of shareholder activism, based largely in mature

capital markets like the US, come to different conclusions regarding its impact on firm

performance.

In this paper, I collect data on shareholder activism events in the China A Share

market between 2006 and 2016. The sample includes 60 companies targeted by 42

activist investors over this period. I find that institutional investors, typically industrial

capital and private funds, playing an increasingly important role in corporate governance

of Chinese listed companies through activism. The disclosure of the holdings of activists

results in large gains in the target firm. I also find subsequent improvements in long

-term operational performance of target firms. Activist investors in China focus on

smaller targets and those characterized by higher agency costs and lower operating

performance. Activists appear to be largely concerned with improvements in business

strategy and M&A activity. Non-hostile behavior is more likely to be related to successful

activism in China. In addition to statistical evidence, I present case studies of the

“BaoWan dispute” and the activist investment of Butterfly Capital in two firms,

“Guonong” and “Xiuqiang”. The case studies highlight the mechanism employed by these

firms to influence performance.

I conclude with policy recommendations and direction for further research.