General managerial skills and external communication

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Description
This paper examines whether CEOs with general managerial skills are better at achieving the goals of external communication. Using the General Ability Index developed by Custodio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013) to measure CEOs' general managerial skills, I find that firms

This paper examines whether CEOs with general managerial skills are better at achieving the goals of external communication. Using the General Ability Index developed by Custodio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013) to measure CEOs' general managerial skills, I find that firms with generalist CEOs are more likely to obtain the desired outcomes of communication, including the smaller difference between analyst forecasts and management guidance, less dispersion in analyst forecasts, higher analyst following, and higher institutional ownership, after controlling for CEO talent and the impact of Regulation FD. Moreover, I provide direct evidence that general managerial skills are more important to external communication under poor information environments. I also investigate the characteristics of analysts who follow firms with generalists, and my findings suggest the private interaction with analysts is an important communication channel for generalists. Finally, I find that generalists are able to attract dedicated investors and gain long-term capital for their firms. Overall, I provide evidence on the growing importance of general managerial skills in external communication. This paper offers new insights into why CEOs with general skills are paid at a premium over those with specific skills, as documented in previous studies.
Date Created
2015
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Essays in corporate policy: dividend policy, index labeling effect, investment, and cash flow duration

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Description
This dissertation consists of two essays on corporate policy. The first chapter analyzes whether being labeled a “growth” firm or a “value” firm affects the firm’s dividend policy. I focus on the dividend policy because of its discretionary nature and

This dissertation consists of two essays on corporate policy. The first chapter analyzes whether being labeled a “growth” firm or a “value” firm affects the firm’s dividend policy. I focus on the dividend policy because of its discretionary nature and the link to investor demand. To address endogeneity concerns, I use regression discontinuity design around the threshold to assign firms to each category. The results show that “value” firms have a significantly higher dividend payout - about four percentage points - than growth firms. This approach establishes a causal link between firm “growth/value” labels and dividend policy.

The second chapter develops investment policy model which associated with du- ration of cash flow. Firms are doing their business by operating a portfolio of projects that have various duration, and the duration of the project portfolio generates dif- ferent duration of cash flow stream. By assuming the duration of cash flow as a firm specific characteristic, this paper analyzes how the duration of cash flow affects firms’ investment decision. I develop a model of investment, external finance, and savings to characterize how firms’ decision is affected by the duration of cash flow. Firms maximize total value of cash flow, while they have to maintain their solvency by paying a fixed cost for the operation. I empirically confirm the positive correlation between duration of cash flow and investment with theoretical support. Financial constraint suffocates the firm when they face solvency issue, so that model with financial constraint shows that the correlation between duration of cash flow and investment is stronger than low financial constraint case.
Date Created
2015
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Evidence on the value of director monitoring: a natural experiment

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Description
I examine the determinants and implications of the level of director monitoring. I use the distance between directors' domiciles and firm headquarters as a proxy for the level of monitoring and the introduction of a new airline route between director

I examine the determinants and implications of the level of director monitoring. I use the distance between directors' domiciles and firm headquarters as a proxy for the level of monitoring and the introduction of a new airline route between director domicile and firm HQ as an exogenous shock to the level of monitoring. I find a strong relation between distance and both board meeting attendance and director membership on strategic versus monitoring committees. Increased monitoring, as measured by a reduction in effective distance, by way of addition of a direct flight, is associated with a 3% reduction in firm value. A reduction in effective distance is also associated with less risk-taking, lower stock return volatility, lower accounting return volatility, lower R&D; spending, fewer acquisitions, and fewer patents.
Date Created
2014
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