Office managing partners, non-audit services, and audit quality

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Description
This study investigates the relation between the line of service (audit, tax, advisory) of Big Four office managing partners (OMPs) and both non-audit service fees and audit quality. Given that audit quality has been shown to vary across offices and

This study investigates the relation between the line of service (audit, tax, advisory) of Big Four office managing partners (OMPs) and both non-audit service fees and audit quality. Given that audit quality has been shown to vary across offices and because changes in office-level leadership can impact the office culture, I examine the impact of the OMP’s line of service on non-audit service fees and audit quality. I find that when an accounting firm office changes leadership to an advisory OMP, non-audit service revenues increase while audit quality suffers. This finding is consistent with advisory partners encouraging an office culture that emphasizes selling non-audit services more than conducting quality audits. Overall, this study provides evidence consistent with regulators’ concerns that the recent trend toward greater advisory services at the largest accounting firms reduces their focus on providing high-quality audits, thereby leading to decreased audit quality.
Date Created
2016
Agent

Participation in employee stock option exchange programs and future stock returns

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Description
In this paper, I investigate whether participation in employee stock option exchange programs contains private information about future stock returns. High participation in employee stock option exchange programs is associated with negative future abnormal returns over the ensuing 12-month period.

In this paper, I investigate whether participation in employee stock option exchange programs contains private information about future stock returns. High participation in employee stock option exchange programs is associated with negative future abnormal returns over the ensuing 12-month period. This association is moderated by the transparency of the firm's information environment: high institutional ownership and high financial statement informativeness weaken the negative relation between participation and abnormal returns. Controlling for transparency of the firms' information environment, the association between participation and future returns arises primarily from firms that allow the CEO to participate.
Date Created
2013
Agent