Lakoff and Levinson claim they have discredited the theory of universal grammar. This dissertation discusses the possibility of a universal humor, suggesting that if universals exist in language's most playful and least rule-governed aspect then they must exist in grammar, language's least playful and most rule-governed aspect. Lakoff's and Levinson's texts are closely analyzed to demonstrate that their claims against Chomsky are not firmly supported; that their groundbreaking new theories of language, perception and cognition do not constitute data that undermines Chomskyan theory; that Levinson's theory of a universal mechanism for human interaction is no stronger than the the grammar universals that Levinson strongly rejects. It is suggested that the litmus test of culture-specific versus universal language may be its level of rhetorical density, as illustrated with humor and naming samples. It is argued that Fillmore's deep case theory, as explained by Nilsen using semantic features and pragmatic intent, has never lost its status as a linguistic universal; Chomsky's theoretical debt to Charles Fillmore may indicate that he unconsciously used Fillmore's deep case, which for Chomsky became thematic relations, without realizing that Fillmore had been the impetus for his research. It is argued that none of the theories of universality, typology or conceptual metaphor may be considered mutually exclusive.