This dissertation seeks to theorize small state strategic culture with special reference to the attitude of the ASEAN states toward institutionalizing regional cooperative security architectures. The quantitative case studies show that in small states where historically rooted strategic preferences may be limited, material influences and situational considerations take precedence over ideational factors in the making of the state's strategic culture. Second, the content of small state strategic culture focuses primarily on foreign and security policy issues that originate in their neighborhood. Lastly, Small states' threat perceptions from the neighborhood over time dictate the formation of strategic culture (provocative vs. cooperative). The qualitative case studies demonstrate that small Southeast Asian states (Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia) exhibit a higher tendency for conflict. Multilateral cooperation is at best selective. Bilateral means is still the preferred policy approach when dealing with other states. This dissertation concludes with a pessimistic remark on the prospects for the development and maturation of the ASEAN Political-Security Community. At its current stage, the APSC appears to be a policy instrument created only to reinforce ASEAN's centrality in charting the region's security architecture. This is no small accomplishment in itself nonetheless.

Counterinsurgency (COIN) is a long process that even great powers struggle with. Nevertheless, South Korea as a middle power was successful with COINs in Vietnam and Iraq. What were the drivers for the Republic of Korea (ROK) military's success? This dissertation maintains that the unusual nature of missions coupled with political/socio-cultural advantages are sufficient conditions for success of the middle power COIN. COIN missions are seen as unusual to middle powers. A rare mission stimulates military forces to fight harder because they recognize this mission as an opportunity to increase their national prestige. COIN mission success is also more probable for middle powers because their forces make the best of their country's political/socio-cultural advantages. The ROK military's COINs are optimal cases to test these hypotheses. The ROK military's COIN in Vietnam was an extremely rare mission, which increased its enthusiasm. This enthusiasm was converted into appropriate capabilities. By identifying battleground dynamics, the ROK forces initially chose an enemy-oriented approach based upon the method of company-led tactical base, and then later introduced a population-led method. South Korea's political/socio-cultural advantages also contributed to its military success in Vietnam. The Confucius culture that South Koreans and Vietnamese shared allowed the ROK forces to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese population. The mission in Iraq was also a rare and important one for national prestige. Accordingly, South Korean forces were equipped with pride and were enthusiastic about missions in Arbil. They changed their organization from a rigid one to a more flexible one by strengthening civil-military units. The ROK military possessed the ability to choose a population-centric approach. South Korea's political and cultural climate also served as an advantage to accomplish COIN in Iraq. The culture of Jung allowed ROK soldiers to sincerely help the local Iraqis. This project contributes to developing a theory of the middle power COIN. The findings also generate security policy implications of how to deal with contingent situations led by the collapse of the North Korean regime and how to redefine the ROK military strategy for the future.

This thesis seeks to build upon the empirical use of the Copenhagen School of security studies by evaluating and investigating speech-acts in recent Guatemalan newspaper media as they relate to drug trafficking within the geopolitical borders of Guatemala, particularly induced by Los Zetas, a Mexican drug cartel. The study attempts to engage a critical theoretical framework to study securitization within the country and thereby build upon the theory by conducting real-life analysis. Using a research program that is made up of content and text analysis of national press and presidential speeches, I test several hypotheses that pertain to the processes of Guatemala's current drug trade and drug trafficking securitization. By coding securitizing speech-acts and discursive frames in the national print media, I identify the national elite, the power relations between the national elite and citizenship, and attempts to dramatize the issue of drug trade. Upon analyzing the findings of such securitization, I propose several hypotheses as to why the national elite seeks high politicization of drug trade and the implications that rest on such drastic measures. This thesis itself, then, has important implications: it uses empirical tools to help further the theoretical foundations of the Copenhagen School, it examines the process of securitization study from a real world context outside the developed world, and it presents important information on the possible consequences of securitizing drug trade.