Robust Conservation Anarchy: Comparing Treaty Institutional Design for Evidence of Ostrom’s Design Principles, Fit, and Polycentricity

Institutions (rules, norms, and shared strategies) are social feedback systems that structure actors’ decision-making context. It is important to investigate institutional design to understand how rules interact and generate feedbacks that affect robustness, i.e., the ability to respond to change. This is particularly important when assessing sustainable use/conservation trade-offs that affect species’ long-term survival. My research utilized the institutional grammar (IG) and robust institutional design to investigate these linkages in the context of four international conservation treaties.

First, the IG was used to code the regulatory formal treaty rules. The coded statements were then assessed to determine the rule linkages and dynamic interactions with a focus on monitoring and related reporting and enforcement mechanisms. Treaties with a regulatory structure included a greater number and more tightly linked rules related to these mechanisms than less regulatory instruments. A higher number of actors involved in these activities at multiple levels also seemed critical to a well-functioning monitoring system.

Then, drawing on existing research, I built a set of constitutive rule typologies to supplement the IG and code the treaties’ constitutive rules. I determined the level of fit between the constitutive and regulatory rules by examining the monitoring mechanisms, as well as treaty opt-out processes. Treaties that relied on constitutive rules to guide actor decision-making generally exhibited gaps and poorer rule fit. Regimes which used constitutive rules to provide actors with information related to the aims, values, and context under which regulatory rules were being advanced tended to exhibit better fit, rule consistency, and completeness.

The information generated in the prior studies, as well as expert interviews, and the analytical frameworks of Ostrom’s design principles, fit, and polycentricity, then aided the analysis of treaty robustness. While all four treaties were polycentric, regulatory regimes exhibited strong information processing feedbacks as evidenced by the presence of all design principles (in form and as perceived by experts) making them theoretically more robust to change than non-regulatory ones. Interestingly, treaties with contested decision-making seemed more robust to change indicating contestation facilitates robust decision-making or its effects are ameliorated by rule design.