Plea Bargains: A Hindrance to Justice?

This paper looks at case studies, legal journals, and legal commentaries to examine the history of plea bargains and determine how such a practice slowly crept its way into the American judicial system. Next, I discern both the two specific benefits and three disadvantages of utilizing plea bargains in a system that was traditionally renowned for its unique form of adversarial / trial based justice. By analyzing case studies and legal texts, I find that the administrative advantages and cost benefits used to rationalize continued usage of plea deals does not outweigh its extremely negative effects on significant aspects of law and the American legal system. These significant negative effects as a product of the plea bargain are a definitive hindrance to justice and further characterize the system as no longer fair and certainly not equitable. Consequently, I assert that in order to maintain the ethics of the system, plea bargains should be removed. I also generally outline the Philadelphia Bench Trial as a prospective and viable alternative to plea bargains that could act as an intriguing substitute. The Philadelphia Bench Trial represents a highly viable alternative to the plea bargain and consequently preserves many of the advantages plea bargains offer the system without sacrificing the adversarial element necessary to receive correct and accurate verdicts.