Vitiating Consent: A Functional Analysis of Deception's and Coercion's Consent-Undermining Force

In this thesis, I delve into the complex ethical issue of deception and coercion as external factors that can undermine consent. Countless theorists have debated the moral permissibility of different forms of deception and coercion, and in this thesis, I propose my own solution to this challenging problem in the ethics of consent. Narrow in scope, my investigation focuses on the morally transformative power of consent and how deception and coercion hinder consent from performing this morally transformative "magic." I argue that certain features of sex are essential to the act of consent, and that deception about these features fundamentally undermines the validity of consent. Furthermore, I support David Boonin's distinction between threats and offers in the coercion literature as the most compelling distinction thus far. Through rigorous analysis and critical engagement with existing literature, my thesis contributes to the ongoing philosophical discourse on consent, deception, and coercion, shedding light on the intricacies of these issues and advancing our understanding of this complex ethical landscape.