How Russia Could Have Saved the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

Following the Russian Federation’s illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the world has once again found itself in a time of crisis. President Vladimir Putin has chosen to rewind the clock and restore the Cold War-era divide between Russia and the United States. The European Union, while still divided internally on numerous issues, has seemingly chosen to rise to the occasion in the wake of Russia’s invasion and assert itself as an equal party to both Cold War-era rivals. All the while China, the pacing, ever vigilant threat, continues to keep its cards close to its chest, and it remains to be seen whether a new Sino-Soviet split will emerge just as before or if the adage “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” still rings true. However, 2022 is not 1962, at least not yet. The global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the culmination of sixty years of constant effort between adversary and ally alike, exists to save the United States and Russia from themselves. Despite the breadth and authority of the regime there are threats abound to its existence, particularly in this time of deep uncertainty. It is incumbent upon the nuclear powers of the world, and Russia especially, to ensure that it does not become a casualty of this age. The world must therefore look back to the early days of the Cold War when crises were abundant, and the United States and the Soviet Union repeatedly brought humanity to the edge of the nuclear abyss. What we learn from doing so is that, while difficult, the global nuclear non-proliferation regime can be supported through unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral actions such as novel weaponry moratoriums, a return to adversarial arms control, and achieving the universality of export control regimes, respectively.