Human Rights in the Late Republic: Capital Punishment, Philosophy, and the Roman Citizen

In this study, I will address the human rights of Roman citizens in the Late Republic, focusing on Cicero’s Ad Quintum Fratrem and In Verrem to answer the following question: Did the universalist philosophical interest in human rights, evident in Cicero, ever translate to actual, practical legal principles to protect peoples subject to Roman law from arbitrary capital punishment? Although Romans had an analog to human rights in the lofty realms of philosophical thought, this idea was not fully developed in the practical legal sphere and did not serve to protect non- citizens from arbitrary capital punishment, as the modern perception of the word denotes. The lack of procedure to organize persecution for the position of praetor until after the end of their term allowed selfish leaders to inflict arbitrary punishments on peoples subject to the Roman sphere of influence, even citizens, without answering for their actions in court. Because praetors could not be prosecuted for their actions in office until the end of their term, laws intended to protect subjects from arbitrary punishment could be disregarded until long after those subjects had suffered their punishment and/or execution. This system failed to protect these peoples from arbitrary punishment by the praetors because the state could not reprimand them in time to save their subjects from arbitrary sentencing. Therefore, the praetors were at liberty to violate what we might consider basic human rights.