Description
This dissertation consists in two chapters. In the first chapter I collected and digitized historical tax records from the Spanish colonial regime in Ecuador to estimate the long-run effects of a forced labor institution called concertaje on today’s economic performance. This institution allowed landlords to retain indigenous workers due to unpaid debts, and forced them to work as peasants in rural estates known as haciendas. In order to identify the causal effects of concertaje, I exploit variation in its intensity caused by differences in labor requirements from the crops a region could grow. I first report that an increase in 10 percentage points in concertaje rates is associated with a 6 percentage points increase in contemporary poverty. I then explore several channels of persistence. Districts with higher concertaje rates have been historically associated with higher illiteracy rates, lower school enrollment, and populations with fewer years of education. I also report that concertaje is associated with a higher fraction of people working nowadays in the agricultural sector.
In the second chapter I use administrative data on the ownership, management, and taxes for the universe of all firms in Ecuador to study the role of family management in firm dynamics and its implications for aggregate productivity. A novel finding I document is that family-managed firms grow half as quickly as externally-managed firms. This growth differential implies that family-managed firms account for half of employment, despite comprising 80% of firms. I construct a general equilibrium model of firm dynamics that is consistent with these facts. Entrepreneurs choose whether to utilize family members as managers or hire external managers. External managers allow firms to scale up production, but their efficiency is a affected due to contractual frictions. Changes in the contractual environment that lead to a drop in the presence of family-managed firms by half could increase output on the order of 6%, as firms that abandon family management enjoy rapid growth.
In the second chapter I use administrative data on the ownership, management, and taxes for the universe of all firms in Ecuador to study the role of family management in firm dynamics and its implications for aggregate productivity. A novel finding I document is that family-managed firms grow half as quickly as externally-managed firms. This growth differential implies that family-managed firms account for half of employment, despite comprising 80% of firms. I construct a general equilibrium model of firm dynamics that is consistent with these facts. Entrepreneurs choose whether to utilize family members as managers or hire external managers. External managers allow firms to scale up production, but their efficiency is a affected due to contractual frictions. Changes in the contractual environment that lead to a drop in the presence of family-managed firms by half could increase output on the order of 6%, as firms that abandon family management enjoy rapid growth.
Details
Title
- Essays in Economic Development
Contributors
- Rivadeneira Acosta, Alex Pierre (Author)
- Ventura, Gustavo (Thesis advisor)
- Vereshchagina, Galina (Committee member)
- Schoellman, Todd (Committee member)
- Arizona State University (Publisher)
Date Created
The date the item was original created (prior to any relationship with the ASU Digital Repositories.)
2019
Subjects
Resource Type
Collections this item is in
Note
- Doctoral Dissertation Economics 2019