Description
I study the design of two different institutions to evaluate the welfare implications
of counterfactual policies. In particular, I analyze (i) the problem of assigning
students to colleges (majors) in a centralized admission system; and (ii) an auction
where the seller can use securities to determine winner’s payment, and bidders
suffer negative externalities. In the former, I provide a novel methodology to
evaluate counterfactual policies when the admission mechanism is manipulable.
In the latter, I determine which instrument yields the highest expected revenue
from the class of instruments that combines cash and equity payments.
of counterfactual policies. In particular, I analyze (i) the problem of assigning
students to colleges (majors) in a centralized admission system; and (ii) an auction
where the seller can use securities to determine winner’s payment, and bidders
suffer negative externalities. In the former, I provide a novel methodology to
evaluate counterfactual policies when the admission mechanism is manipulable.
In the latter, I determine which instrument yields the highest expected revenue
from the class of instruments that combines cash and equity payments.
Details
Title
- Essays in Market Design
Contributors
- Hernandez Chanto, Allan Roberto (Author)
- Manelli, Alejandro (Thesis advisor)
- Friedenberg, Amanda (Committee member)
- Chade, Hector (Committee member)
- Arizona State University (Publisher)
Date Created
The date the item was original created (prior to any relationship with the ASU Digital Repositories.)
2017
Subjects
Resource Type
Collections this item is in
Note
- Doctoral Dissertation Economics 2017