Essays in health insurance

This work is driven by two facts. First, the majority of households in the U.S. obtain health insurance through their employer. Second, around 20% of working age households choose not to purchase health insurance. The link between employment and health insurance has potentially large implications for household selection into employment and participation in public health insurance programs. In these two essays, I address the role of public and private provisions of health insurance on household employment and insurance decisions, the distribution of welfare, and the aggregate economy. In the first essay, I quantify the effects of key parts of the 2010 health care reform legislation. I construct a lifecycle incomplete markets model with an endogenous choice of health insurance coverage and calibrate it to U.S. data. I find that the reform decreases the fraction of uninsured households by 94% and increases ex-ante household welfare by 2.3% in consumption equivalence. The main driving force behind the reduction in the uninsured population is the health insurance mandate, although I find no significant welfare loss associated with the elimination of the mandatory health insurance provision. In the second essay, I provide a quantitative analysis of the role of medical expenditure risk in the employment and insurance decisions of households approaching retirement. I construct a dynamic general equilibrium model of the household that allows for self-selection into employment and health insurance coverage. I find that the welfare cost of medical expenditure risk is large at 5% of lifetime consumption equivalence for the non-institutionalized population. In addition, the provision of health insurance through the employer accounts for 20% of hours worked for households ages 60-64. Finally, I provide an quantitative analysis of changes in Medicare minimum eligibility age in a series of policy experiments.