Desert in Distributive and Retributive Justice

What we think people can be said to deserve has far-reaching implications. Desert presents some challenging questions about the institution of punishment (retributive justice) and the structures in society regulating distributions of scarce goods (distributive justice). For the distributive side, questions include: Can people be said to deserve the wealth they earn? Do people deserve the talents that give them advantages within the market? And for the retributive side: What punishments do criminals deserve? What justifies the decision to punish someone who commits a crime? These questions and more arise when philosophers write on desert in relation to distributive and retributive justice. John Rawls presents us with a view of distributive desert that some find problematic when it is applied to retributive justice. As a result, additional questions arise about whether desert can be treated differently in distributive and retributive justice. Section I of my paper sketches the tension within Rawls's views on distributive and retributive justice. Since this tension is best framed in terms of desert, the remaining sections heavily focus on that concept. Section II presents Samuel Scheffler's solution to the tension in Rawls's views. Section III covers Jeffrey Moriarty's criticisms of the arguments Scheffler advances. Section IV discusses Jake Greenblum's criticisms of Scheffler's assessment of Rawls. In Section V, I evaluate the philosophers' positions and offer my conclusions on desert's proper role within distributive and retributive justice.