Description
This study analyzes the impact of incentive programs on performance. Agency theory and Information Measurement theory are used to hypothesize about the impact of incentives upon performance. Empirical evidence from the case study shows that incentives are ineffective at increasing performance, but the statistical significance of the data is too low to generalize the findings beyond that of short term cold call sales. Several avenues for continued research are suggested.
Details
Title
- AGENCY THEORY VS. INFORMATION MEASUREMENT THEORY: A CASE STUDY ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INCENTIVES IN THE WORKPLACE
Contributors
- Carlson, Andrew Wayne (Author)
- Lee, Peggy (Thesis director)
- Kashiwagi, Dean (Committee member)
- Totscheck, Chaz (Committee member)
- Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
- W. P. Carey School of Business (Contributor)
- Department of Management (Contributor)
Date Created
The date the item was original created (prior to any relationship with the ASU Digital Repositories.)
2013-05
Resource Type
Collections this item is in