Description
Penetration testing is regarded as the gold-standard for understanding how well an organization can withstand sophisticated cyber-attacks. However, the recent prevalence of markets specializing in zero-day exploits on the darknet make exploits widely available to potential attackers. The cost associated with these sophisticated kits generally precludes penetration testers from simply obtaining such exploits – so an alternative approach is needed to understand what exploits an attacker will most likely purchase and how to defend against them. In this paper, we introduce a data-driven security game framework to model an attacker and provide policy recommendations to the defender. In addition to providing a formal framework and algorithms to develop strategies, we present experimental results from applying our framework, for various system configurations, on real-world exploit market data actively mined from the darknet.
Details
Title
- Data Driven Game Theoretic Cyber Threat Mitigation
Contributors
- Robertson, John James (Author)
- Shakarian, Paulo (Thesis director)
- Doupe, Adam (Committee member)
- Electrical Engineering Program (Contributor)
- Computer Science and Engineering Program (Contributor)
- Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Date Created
The date the item was original created (prior to any relationship with the ASU Digital Repositories.)
2016-05
Resource Type
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