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Research on collective action and common-pool resources is extensive. However, little work has concentrated on the effect of variability in resource availability and collective action, especially in the context of asymmetric access to resources. Earlier works have demonstrated that environmental

Research on collective action and common-pool resources is extensive. However, little work has concentrated on the effect of variability in resource availability and collective action, especially in the context of asymmetric access to resources. Earlier works have demonstrated that environmental variability often leads to a reduction of collective action in the governance of shared resources. Here we assess how environmental variability may impact collective action. We performed a behavioral experiment involving an irrigation dilemma. In this dilemma participants invested first into a public fund that generated water resources for the group, which were subsequently appropriated by one participant at a time from head end to tail end. The amount of resource generated for the given investment level was determined by a payoff table and a stochastic event representing environmental variability, i.e., rainfall. Results show that that (1) upstream users’ behavior is by far the most important variable in determining the outcome of collective action; (2) environmental variability (i.e. risk level in investing in the resource) has little effect on individual investment and extraction levels; and (3) the action-reaction feedback is fundamental in determining the success or failure of communities.

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    Title
    • Irrigation Experiments in the Lab: Trust, Environmental Variability, and Collective Action
    Contributors
    Date Created
    2015
    Resource Type
  • Text
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    Identifier
    • Digital object identifier: 10.5751/ES-07772-200412
    • Identifier Type
      International standard serial number
      Identifier Value
      1708-3087
    Note
    • The final version of this article, as published in Ecology and Society, can be viewed online at: https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol20/iss4/art12/

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    This is a suggested citation. Consult the appropriate style guide for specific citation guidelines.

    Baggio, J. A., Rollins, N. D., Pérez, I., & Janssen, M. A. (2015). Irrigation experiments in the lab: trust, environmental variability, and collective action. Ecology and Society, 20(4). doi:10.5751/es-07772-200412

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